Clutch vs non-clutch

[S5Dewey]

No. What we're saying is that we want one of our most consistent relievers in the 9th inning because a lead blown in the 9th is the hardest of all blown leads to recover from due to having the least time. So putting your stingiest run-allower in the position where giving up a run would go worst for you just makes sense statistically and logically.

 

I would maintain that it makes sense to put your stingiest run-allower in the game when the chance of giving up the most runs is the greatest. What's going on now is CYA mode for the managers. This enables them to say, "Ya, we fell behind by two runs in the 7th but I wanted to hold off my closer to the 9th in case we came back". Wouldn't it make at least as much sense to keep the team from falling behind in the 7th?

 

Tito had done things in the past that defied past baseball logic and made them work. It's going to be interesting to see if other FO's and managers follow up on what the Guardians did during the 2016 playoffs.

[moonslav59]

This enables them to say, "Ya, we fell behind by two runs in the 7th but I wanted to hold off my closer to the 9th in case we came back". Wouldn't it make at least as much sense to keep the team from falling behind in the 7th?

 

I get your point, and I do think they should bring in the closer in the 7th or 8th, if a couple or more runners get on base, but not to lead off the 7th.

 

I think hitters might tee off on the guy who replaces your closer, as the pitches will look "slower" or "break less" with inferior pitchers coming in after the closer to finish out the game.

[Dojji]

I would maintain that it makes sense to put your stingiest run-allower in the game when the chance of giving up the most runs is the greatest. What's going on now is CYA mode for the managers. This enables them to say, "Ya, we fell behind by two runs in the 7th but I wanted to hold off my closer to the 9th in case we came back". Wouldn't it make at least as much sense to keep the team from falling behind in the 7th?

 

Tito had done things in the past that defied past baseball logic and made them work. It's going to be interesting to see if other FO's and managers follow up on what the Guardians did during the 2016 playoffs.

 

so what you're basically saying is that managers need to be literally precognitive so that they never pull their starter early and then give up even more runs later on.

 

The only perspective the relief ace model really works from is the perspective of hindsight because there's no way of being sure which threat was the most decisive until all the numbers are already in. For a guy calling the game in realtime the relief-ace model is just an excuse to second guess him.

 

The most likely end result of a relief ace model is you wind up burning the guy at the first real sign of trouble, and not having him if the opposing team rallies even worse in an inning or so, and probably overworking him over the course of the season. Managers have a problem with knowing when not to use a guy unless they have a good system in place, that's part of what the Eckerlseyan inning-role system provides them

 

I think the best team that ever tried to relief ace was probably the 06 Tigers, with Zumaya and Rodney as the main firemen and the mediocre Todd Jones closing things out. They did OK for reasons that had nothing to do with the bullpen, got to the World Series by getting lucky with their opponents in the two previous playoff series, specifically the ancient, dying Yankees core and an A's team that had no business getting to the ALCS, and wound up getting walloped by a pretty mediocre-on-paper Cardinals team that used a conventional closer (I think Adam Wainwright actually played that role for the team at the time).

 

After getting beaten by a radically inferior team that did things the right way, the Tigers switched to a more standard closer model not long afterward. So you see, it's not like teams never tried it. It's that teams tried it then realized why it didn't work and went back to the correct, Eckersleyan model.

 

if you don't have that guy who can get outs in middle innings, AND that guy who can get outs in the 9th, whichever one you don't have is gonna screw you over. The whole debate is so much forum fluff.

Edited February 16, 2017 by Dojji

[notin]

I don't think there's any question that baseball is the hardest sport to identify clutch because randomness is such a factor.

 

But if it exists in other major sports it seems credible that it also exists in baseball. Maybe the discussion of clutch should also be looking at other sports. Why would baseball be different?

 

S5 was talking about the kid making the 2 free throws at the end of the game. I wonder if clutch free throw shooting stats in the NBA have ever been looked at.

 

I don't like comparisons to other sports, especially basketball. And especially free throws, where the game physically stops abd all eyes are on one player when the rest of the game is fast-paced action/reaction.. Potential clutch at bats in baseball go through the same process as all other at bats.

 

And while players are human, you can't argue successfully all hitters put less weightand less effort and feel less ppressure in "non-clutch" at bats. For a lot of them, hitting .300 or whatever, it doesn't matter where the hits come from.

 

Especially for hitters, baseball is a game of failures. The difference in batting averages is very little from top to bottom. Clutch could just as easily be an illusion creased by remembering big hits in big situations, because we expect even the best hitters top make outs 70% of the time anyway. So those can be discounted.

 

If you look at most of the hitters you think of as clutch, you will find for the most part, they are also the flat out better hitters.

[Bellhorn04]

so what you're basically saying is that managers need to be literally precognitive so that they never pull their starter early and then give up even more runs later on.

 

The only perspective the relief ace model really works from is the perspective of hindsight because there's no way of being sure which threat was the most decisive until all the numbers are already in. For a guy calling the game in realtime the relief-ace model is just an excuse to second guess him.

 

The most likely end result of a relief ace model is you wind up burning the guy at the first real sign of trouble, and not having him if the opposing team rallies even worse in an inning or so, and probably overworking him over the course of the season. Managers have a problem with knowing when not to use a guy unless they have a good system in place, that's part of what the Eckerlseyan inning-role system provides them

 

I think the best team that ever tried to relief ace was probably the 06 Tigers, with Zumaya and Rodney as the main firemen and the mediocre Todd Jones closing things out. They did OK for reasons that had nothing to do with the bullpen, got to the World Series by getting lucky with their opponents in the two previous playoff series, specifically the ancient, dying Yankees core and an A's team that had no business getting to the ALCS, and wound up getting walloped by a pretty mediocre-on-paper Cardinals team that used a conventional closer (I think Adam Wainwright actually played that role for the team at the time).

 

After getting beaten by a radically inferior team that did things the right way, the Tigers switched to a more standard closer model not long afterward. So you see, it's not like teams never tried it. It's that teams tried it then realized why it didn't work and went back to the correct, Eckersleyan model.

 

if you don't have that guy who can get outs in middle innings, AND that guy who can get outs in the 9th, whichever one you don't have is gonna screw you over. The whole debate is so much forum fluff.

 

I don't think it's just forum fluff.

 

Hypothetical situation:

 

It's a playoff game.

 

You're leading 2-0 going to the bottom of the 6th. Your starter has been okay but is probably tiring. The first two guys get on and you pull him. Who do you bring in?

 

If it was the 2016 Guardians Tito would have brought Miller in there, whereas the traditional move would be to bring in Shaw.

 

By bringing in Miller you improve your chances of snuffing out what might be a game-turning rally.

 

That's an example of using the relief ace in the critical moment instead of saving him for a save opportunity that might not come. You may be able to use Miller for the 7th as well. You may score some runs in the 7th and the 8th and build a big lead.

[Eddy Ballgame]

I don't like comparisons to other sports, especially basketball. And especially free throws, where the game physically stops abd all eyes are on one player when the rest of the game is fast-paced action/reaction.. Potential clutch at bats in baseball go through the same process as all other at bats.

 

And while players are human, you can't argue successfully all hitters put less weightand less effort and feel less ppressure in "non-clutch" at bats. For a lot of them, hitting .300 or whatever, it doesn't matter where the hits come from.

 

Especially for hitters, baseball is a game of failures. The difference in batting averages is very little from top to bottom. Clutch could just as easily be an illusion creased by remembering big hits in big situations, because we expect even the best hitters top make outs 70% of the time anyway. So those can be discounted.

 

If you look at most of the hitters you think of as clutch, you will find for the most part, they are also the flat out better hitters.

 

I don't think "clutch" can be proven or disproven, but as I mentioned earlier, I believe that if you secretly polled every player in baseball, asking which teammate they'd want up in a big spot, I'd bet the "best hitter" on the team wouldn't be the response a lot more often than you would think.

[Dojji]

I don't think it's just forum fluff.

 

Hypothetical situation:

 

It's a playoff game.

 

You're leading 2-0 going to the bottom of the 6th. Your starter has been okay but is probably tiring. The first two guys get on and you pull him. Who do you bring in?

 

Whoever you bring in, you're leaving yourself open to an 8th inning rally if you expend your "fireman."

 

Also this stuff looks good on paper until you add prior usage of the bullpen into the scneario. The same scenario you mention above, how does it change if you've used your "Miller" 3 of the last 4 games?

 

The reason the model is useless is because you can never count on one reliever to get all the critical outs. Even the Tigers were smart enough to use Zumaya AND Rodney. Squashing rallies throughout the middle innings over 162 is too big a job to have one solitary Dutchman with all his fingers in every hole in every dike. A 9th inning "closer" role is something you can expect a reliever to handle physically most of the time it happens to be important, since not every game is close and late.

 

A relief ace model is basically begging for 2, maybe 3 such "aces," otherwise the one guy you have winds up hideously overworked. And at that point the "model" is just "have good pitchers to work the middle innings." This is not rocket science.

 

The only good bullpen is a DEEP bullpen. Anything else is a debate about how to rearrange deck chairs on the Titanic.

Edited February 16, 2017 by Dojji

[Bellhorn04]

Whoever you bring in, you're leaving yourself open to an 8th inning rally if you expend your "fireman."

 

Yes, but it's about placing emphasis on the known situation over the unknown situation. The known situation is a 2 run lead, 2 runners on and none out. For the 8th inning, if Miller gets you through the 6th and 7th you bring Shaw in with NOBODY ON BASE. Also you may have INCREASED YOUR LEAD. So it makes sense to deal with this known situation with your best reliever.

 

I'm not disputing your point that you need multiple good relievers to make this work.

[S5Dewey]

I don't like comparisons to other sports, especially basketball. And especially free throws, where the game physically stops abd all eyes are on one player when the rest of the game is fast-paced action/reaction.. Potential clutch at bats in baseball go through the same process as all other at bats.

 

If you look at most of the hitters you think of as clutch, you will find for the most part, they are also the flat out better hitters.

 

I agree with your assessment of not being able to compare basketball with baseball in that basketball is much more of a reaction sport. However, in the context of someone being clutch IMO there are very few sports where "clutch" comes into play any more than the instance I mentioned - a player on the foul line with the game in the balance with no defense to contend with. It's you, the ball, and the rim. Pass or fail. That's pressure and people who can respond to it are "clutch". So IMO "clutch" does exist.

 

As to the players who are clutch being the better hitters, is he a better hitter because he makes solid contact more often, or is it because his performance in clutch situations boosts his statistics? Which came first, the chicken or the egg?

[S5Dewey]

This enables them to say, "Ya, we fell behind by two runs in the 7th but I wanted to hold off my closer to the 9th in case we came back". Wouldn't it make at least as much sense to keep the team from falling behind in the 7th?

 

I get your point, and I do think they should bring in the closer in the 7th or 8th, if a couple or more runners get on base, but not to lead off the 7th.

 

I think hitters might tee off on the guy who replaces your closer, as the pitches will look "slower" or "break less" with inferior pitchers coming in after the closer to finish out the game.

 

Yes. I should have been clearer. I would NEVER bring in my closer for a clean 7th or 8th inning. And even then it would be situational. If, for example, the starter is obviously weakening and has allowed men on base near the top of the order I'd bring in the closer to pitch to #'s 4, 5, 6. OTOH if the #8 & 9 guys are coming up I'd be bringing in my short man.

 

My objection to how managers handle the pen now is that they virtually never will bring in the the big truck to put out a fire. They instead send a small pumper and hope for the best.

 

Unless.... of course, you believe that hitters can 'turn it up a notch' in the 9th. THEN you save your closer to pitch to the hitters who are "clutch".

[Dojji]

Yes, but it's about placing emphasis on the known situation over the unknown situation.

 

And that's how you burn out or overwork your fireman, or consistently commit him too early.

 

The only time to know what the highest leverage situation in the game will be, is after it's over.

 

If you don't have good men to bring in in any given situation, it's entirely academic and pointless to argue about exactly which situations you cover with poor relievers. The likely difference is less than 1 win in an average season. Managers just plain have better things to spend time on.

[Dojji]

Yes. I should have been clearer. I would NEVER bring in my closer for a clean 7th or 8th inning. And even then it would be situational. If, for example, the starter is obviously weakening and has allowed men on base near the top of the order I'd bring in the closer to pitch to #'s 4, 5, 6. OTOH if the #8 & 9 guys are coming up I'd be bringing in my short man.

 

My objection to how managers handle the pen now is that they virtually never will bring in the the big truck to put out a fire. They instead send a small pumper and hope for the best.

 

Unless.... of course, you believe that hitters can 'turn it up a notch' in the 9th. THEN you save your closer to pitch to the hitters who are "clutch".

 

We tried something like that once. We asked for 7 out of Schilling and 2 out of Papelbon. We did it in part of the 5 game stretch in 06 we commonly know as the Boston Massacre, so you can guess how it ended. Papelbon, who barely surrendered any runs at all that year, blew it in the 9th. Because Jonathan Papelbon was not prepared, and was not able, to pitch 2 innings just because we fervently wished he could.

 

This should probably not have surprised us, but then, nobody actually said that fans are good at risk assessment. We tend to let wishful hoping dominate our thought processes.

 

Frankly I see a lot of wishful thinking and woulda-coulda-shoulda in the relief ace model proponents. News flash: if you have to assume everything goes ABSOLUTELY PERFECTLY in decisionmaking, execution and results in order for your model to be successful, especially comparing it to a time-tested model teams have been winning with for decades despite everything that goes wrong over the course of a real season, then your model ain't worth the toilet paper it was written on.

 

Every time the relief ace model has been tried in realtime, the team has abandoned it within 2-3 years. That alone snould be enough to tell proponents of the relief ace models that their model is flushworthy, but see above about fans -- we aren't the best judges of the laws of probability.

 

There *is* a reason the traditional model works. It prevents managers from abusing and overworking their relief arms. It gives defined rules to prevent any one reliever's work load from becoming excessive. And it lets the relievers know in which role they're likely to be deployed to give them time to prepare mentally.

 

The advantage of the fireman model is not enough to offset the disadvantage of abandoning all those subtle benefits. Every time it's been tried this has been verified.

 

It's like Communism. A great idea on paper that was never designed to actually be implemented in realtime, every time it's tried the people trying it wind up wishing they hadn't, and that never stops its proponents from objecting that it has never been "done right" or given a fair test.

Edited February 16, 2017 by Dojji

[Bellhorn04]

And that's how you burn out or overwork your fireman, or consistently commit him too early.

 

The only time to know what the highest leverage situation in the game will be, is after it's over.

 

If you don't have good men to bring in in any given situation, it's entirely academic and pointless to argue about exactly which situations you cover with poor relievers. The likely difference is less than 1 win in an average season. Managers just plain have better things to spend time on.

 

Are you saying that Tito didn't use Miller properly in the playoffs this year?

[Dojji]

Are you saying that Tito didn't use Miller properly in the playoffs this year?

 

I'm saying that Miller proves my point, not yours. He was not doing his job alone, Miller was the front man in a deep bullpen. And it was the depth of the bullpen, not Miller's performance specifically, that told the tale and made the difference in the playoffs for the Tribe.

 

Also, Miller wasn't the only good man in that bullpen, the rank and file of the Guardians pen deserves more credit than it gets. Cleveland had one of the best bullpens in baseball from top to bottom. To call it the Miller show in any way is pure and absolute disrespect to the rest of that very deep and effective pen that virtually carried the team to within 1 run of a World Series win.

 

If he hadn't had a good rank and file pen around him, it wouldn't have mattered what role he played, the opposing teams, including our Sox, would have simply played around the innings he happened to work, as happens all to often in shallow bullpens.

 

The Guardians got as far as they did because they had a deep bullpen, led by Miller and Allen. The decision of whether Miller or any one of 4 other relievers should have closed is utterly academic and pointless because either way you would have both a good closer and a good stable of middle innings .

 

So you look to Miller as a validation of the dead, buried, subsumed and rapidly turning into petroleum Relief Ace model, I see the truth -- a good, deep bullpen that made a large impact in the playoffs and sports media blatherskite notwithstanding, was NOT defined by any one member's performance.

[Slasher9]

Great thread lefty. some good posts.

my take: there is 100% such a thing as being "clutch". we know who they are. one of the best ever will have a plaque in cooperstown in 5 years.

there is 100% such a thing as wilting under the pressure. we know who they are. one of the biggest ever will be collecting $31MM from the sox for the next 6 years.

 

I blame JF for wilters!!!!

[mvp 78]

It's like Communism. A great idea on paper that was never designed to actually be implemented in realtime, every time it's tried the people trying it wind up wishing they hadn't, and that never stops its proponents from objecting that it has never been "done right" or given a fair test.

 

Wrong!

[Dojji]

Socialism, then

[Bellhorn04]

I'm saying that Miller proves my point, not yours. He was not doing his job alone, Miller was the front man in a deep bullpen. And it was the depth of the bullpen, not Miller's performance specifically, that told the tale and made the difference in the playoffs for the Tribe.

 

Also, Miller wasn't the only good man in that bullpen, the rank and file of the Guardians pen deserves more credit than it gets. Cleveland had one of the best bullpens in baseball from top to bottom. To call it the Miller show in any way is pure and absolute disrespect to the rest of that very deep and effective pen that virtually carried the team to within 1 run of a World Series win.

 

If he hadn't had a good rank and file pen around him, it wouldn't have mattered what role he played, the opposing teams, including our Sox, would have simply played around the innings he happened to work, as happens all to often in shallow bullpens.

 

The Guardians got as far as they did because they had a deep bullpen, led by Miller and Allen. The decision of whether Miller or any one of 4 other relievers should have closed is utterly academic and pointless because either way you would have both a good closer and a good stable of middle innings .

 

So you look to Miller as a validation of the dead, buried, subsumed and rapidly turning into petroleum Relief Ace model, I see the truth -- a good, deep bullpen that made a large impact in the playoffs and sports media blatherskite notwithstanding, was NOT defined by any one member's performance.

 

Of course I never said Miller was the only good reliever in that pen.

 

Here are the actual numbers for the 2016 postseason:

 

Miller 19.1 IP 1.40 ERA

Allen 13.2 IP 0.00 ERA

Shaw 10.1 IP 4.35 ERA

Otero 6.2 IP 2.70 ERA

Clevenger 5.2 IP 4.76 ERA

 

If you look at the game logs, in every late and close situation it was Miller, Shaw and Allen.

 

Miller was indeed the relief ace, logging a huge number of innings. Allen was the lights-out closer. Those are the two guys that did it. The rest were okay.

[Kimmi]

I don't think there's any question that baseball is the hardest sport to identify clutch because randomness is such a factor.

 

But if it exists in other major sports it seems credible that it also exists in baseball. Maybe the discussion of clutch should also be looking at other sports. Why would baseball be different?

 

S5 was talking about the kid making the 2 free throws at the end of the game. I wonder if clutch free throw shooting stats in the NBA have ever been looked at.

 

Does clutch exist in other sports?

 

If you define clutch as the ability not to choke under pressure, than I can agree that clutch exists, even in baseball. In that case, however, I would consider pretty much all MLBers as being clutch, as I've said before.

 

If you define clutch as the ability to raise one's performance/ability to a level where it normally isn't, then I do not think it exists. Yes, one can have a clutch moment, but it is not a repeatable skill.

 

In terms of the young kid making the free throws, he absolutely gets credit for not choking under pressure. But did he raise his ability to a whole new level in that moment? I don't think so.

 

I honestly don't know what kind of research has been done on clutch in other sports, but it would be interesting to know what their findings are, if the research does indeed exist.

[Kimmi]

This whole discussion kinda-sorta goes to something I've wondered about and even asked at one point.

 

Aren't we tacitly acknowledging that "clutch" exists when we insist on having a lights-out closer for the 9th inning? Doesn't that imply that there's a real possibility that the hitters in the 9th inning can "turn it up a notch" when necessary?

 

No, I don't think that's the case at all. We bring in our lights out closer in the 9th inning because if the opposition scores in the 9th, the win probability of the game changes drastically.

 

I understand that relief pitchers like to have defined roles, and there is also a concern about getting a closer up in earlier innings then not using him, but IMO, the lights out closer should be used earlier in the game if the situation calls for it.

 

A good 7th inning reliever could get the job done in the 9th most of the time.

[Kimmi]

I've probably posted this before, but what you're saying goes back to what Bill James has said - that teams should use their best relief pitcher situationally. Games are often lost in the 6th, 7th, or 8th innings off the middle relievers while the closer sits on the bench. James says that teams shouldn't hesitate to use their best reliever in their highest pressure situations regardless of the inning.

 

The Cubs had the luxury of having both Miller and a "real closer" so they could use Miller in tight situations but Miller being as effective as he was may have lessened the need for that "real closer".

 

I agree with this.

[Kimmi]

No. What we're saying is that we want one of our most consistent relievers in the 9th inning because a lead blown in the 9th is the hardest of all blown leads to recover from due to having the least time. So putting your stingiest run-allower in the position where giving up a run would go worst for you just makes sense statistically and logically.

 

That is the reason why it's done, but I'm not sure it makes the most sense either statistically or logically.

[Kimmi]

I would maintain that it makes sense to put your stingiest run-allower in the game when the chance of giving up the most runs is the greatest. What's going on now is CYA mode for the managers. This enables them to say, "Ya, we fell behind by two runs in the 7th but I wanted to hold off my closer to the 9th in case we came back". Wouldn't it make at least as much sense to keep the team from falling behind in the 7th?

 

Tito had done things in the past that defied past baseball logic and made them work. It's going to be interesting to see if other FO's and managers follow up on what the Guardians did during the 2016 playoffs.

 

Agreed. Oftentimes the real 'save' situation occurs in the 7th or the 8th inning. It seems kind of illogical to save your closer for a save situation in the 9th that may never come. Use him when the game is really on the line.

[Kimmi]

I don't like comparisons to other sports, especially basketball. And especially free throws, where the game physically stops abd all eyes are on one player when the rest of the game is fast-paced action/reaction.. Potential clutch at bats in baseball go through the same process as all other at bats.

 

And while players are human, you can't argue successfully all hitters put less weightand less effort and feel less ppressure in "non-clutch" at bats. For a lot of them, hitting .300 or whatever, it doesn't matter where the hits come from.

 

Especially for hitters, baseball is a game of failures. The difference in batting averages is very little from top to bottom. Clutch could just as easily be an illusion creased by remembering big hits in big situations, because we expect even the best hitters top make outs 70% of the time anyway. So those can be discounted.

 

If you look at most of the hitters you think of as clutch, you will find for the most part, they are also the flat out better hitters.

 

That pretty much defines your 'clutch' hitters. They hit well in clutch situations because they are good hitters, period.

[mvp 78]

Socialism, then

 

Wrong!

[Bellhorn04]

If you define clutch as the ability not to choke under pressure, than I can agree that clutch exists, even in baseball. In that case, however, I would consider pretty much all MLBers as being clutch, as I've said before.

 

I think that's the definition us 'clutch' believers have pretty much reached a consensus on.

 

All MLBers may be clutch, to have gotten that far, but are they all equally clutch? And does reaching the big leagues prepare you for playing with your team's season on the line?

[Bellhorn04]

That pretty much defines your 'clutch' hitters. They hit well in clutch situations because they are good hitters, period.

 

We're going round in circles, but you're not addressing the question of why not all good hitters hit well in clutch situations.

 

Hall of Famer Jeff Bagwell had a .948 career OPS, but only .685 in the postseason. Because he's such a good hitter, shouldn't he have almost automatically hit well in clutch situations?

[Dojji]

 

If you look at the game logs, in every late and close situation it was Miller, Shaw and Allen.

 

Exactly. A deep bullpen. Miller was the ace of the bullpen, but "relief ace" and specifically tying it back to the long-since-dead rival to the closer model, are both real stretches.

 

Miller was indeed the relief ace, logging a huge number of innings. Allen was the lights-out closer. Those are the two guys that did it. The rest were okay.

 

In other words, exactly what I've been saying. The correct answer to the relief ace v closer model is "why are you asking such a stupid question? Of course you have both on an ideal roster."

 

Which guy you put where is mostly a matter of window dressing.

[cp176]

I think that's the definition us 'clutch' believers have pretty much reached a consensus on.

 

All MLBers may be clutch, to have gotten that far, but are they all equally clutch? And does reaching the big leagues prepare you for playing with your team's season on the line?

 

My opinion would be that most of us who believe in things like "clutch players" know that it is not really something you can not define. Not everything needs to be defined. It is just one of those things.

[S5Dewey]

Does clutch exist in other sports?

 

If you define clutch as the ability to raise one's performance/ability to a level where it normally isn't, then I do not think it exists. Yes, one can have a clutch moment, but it is not a repeatable skill.

 

In terms of the young kid making the free throws, he absolutely gets credit for not choking under pressure. But did he raise his ability to a whole new level in that moment? I don't think so.

 

I'm giving my head a good hard shake here. It sounds like you're saying that you can buy into the mental aspect of a game affecting a player's performance in a negative way but not in a positive way. Why would that be?

 

If he didn't raise his game to a whole new level, was his making two in a row the product of randomness?