How to score a lot of runs

[Orange Juiced]

The Sox really don't have any player having a crazy great offensive season. Ortiz has been excellent, and Jacoby has also been really good, but Pedroia hasn't gone crazy, and nobody else is really lighting it up. So how are the Sox #2 in baseball in runs scored? Lineup depth. Look at the ops+ numbers for their main guys:

 

C - Saltalamacchia: 115

1b - Napoli: 113

2b - Pedroia: 115

SS - Drew: 103

3b - Middlebrooks: 84 (but rising fast; 1.000 ops since his recall)

LF - Gomes: 108

CF - Ellsbury: 108

RF - Victorino: 106

DH - Ortiz: 160

OF - Nava: 121

OF/1b - Carp: 143

 

I mean, up and down the lineup they have guys who are making pitchers work, doing a good job getting on base, and hitting a TON of doubles. They're also very successful stealing bases:

 

Pedroia: 16-21

Ellsbury: 47-51

Victorino: 17-20

(TOT for the 3 guys): 80-92 (87.0%)

 

So those stolen bases turn walks and singles into doubles. Look at last night's second run. Ellsbury beats out an IF hit. Steals 2b. Victorino bunts him to 3rd. Pedroia hits a SF.

 

Putting a lineup like that where *everybody* is an average or above-average offensive player, even if there are few stars having crazy years, will wear down opposing pitchers and allow you, over time, to put up a lot of runs. Clearly it's a formula that's working.

 

 

(sorry this is a new thread for those that don't like new threads; I couldn't find a thread that matched this theme)

[Thunder]

You really don't need a thread to talk about OPS. That doesn't necessarily score runs either.

[sk7326]

Red Sox are 2nd in the league in OBP (not coincidentally, #1 in OBP is also #1 in runs). They are also 2nd in LOBs. Sox are giving themselves tons of chances - the LOBs and runs show it, just a team that gets a lot of baserunners on, and in the long run that will work. It works in April and works in October.

 

Even when guys have struggled (Middlebrooks excepted), the strong approaches prevent them from becoming total offensive zeroes. Before his slump and injuries got a lot worse, Napoli walked enough to carry a .340 OBP while he was still scuffling. Like you said, Nava, Carp, Gomes. They have a lot of guys who do not give at-bats away. I think that was the genesis of Middlebrooks' demotion - you can live with a slump, but not competing at the plate. The take and rake approach gives up a ton of strikeouts - but in general that is not something I tend to worry about, it is a fair price for the good stuff.

[a700hitter]

Put your best hitters up at the top of the lineup in a row-- that's the simple formula. Lefty - Rghty and extending the order by putting a lesser hitter in the middle of your good guys is just a bunch of hooey.

[Orange Juiced]

Put your best hitters up at the top of the lineup in a row-- that's the simple formula. Lefty - Rghty and extending the order by putting a lesser hitter in the middle of your good guys is just a bunch of hooey.

 

So to take that to its logical conclusion, you want your best hitters getting the most opportunities. So based on ops+, here's what the Sox' best lineup would be:

 

DH Ortiz - 160

LF Carp - 143

C Saltalamacchia - 115

2b Pedroia - 115 (obviously you could have Pedroia at 3 and Salty at 4)

1b Napoli - 113

CF Ellsbury - 108

RF Victorino - 106

SS Drew - 103

3b Middlebrooks - 84

 

If you don't like this lineup, how would you change it, and why?

[Bellhorn04]

Put your best hitters up at the top of the lineup in a row-- that's the simple formula. Lefty - Rghty and extending the order by putting a lesser hitter in the middle of your good guys is just a bunch of hooey.

 

Alternating lefty & righty hitters is a logical strategy considering how teams use their bullpens now. In particular, most managers try to have their lefty relievers face lefty hitters as much as possible. If you string together a bunch of lefty hitters it means the other team can bring in a lefty to face a series of hitters. But if you alternate it makes it a lot harder for the other team to match up exactly how they want. So you either get a shot with a RH hitter against a lefty pitcher, or you force the other team to go through their bullpen faster.

[a700hitter]

Alternating lefty & righty hitters is a logical strategy considering how teams use their bullpens now. In particular, most managers try to have their lefty relievers face lefty hitters as much as possible. If you string together a bunch of lefty hitters it means the other team can bring in a lefty to face a series of hitters. But if you alternate it makes it a lot harder for the other team to match up exactly how they want. So you either get a shot with a RH hitter against a lefty pitcher, or you force the other team to go through their bullpen faster.

I think it is over-hyped as a strategy and that it factors little into run production if at all.

[sk7326]

The math for scoring runs is very simple: Step 1: Gets lots of baserunners, Step 2: See step 1.

 

If you have a bunch of guys who can just make good at-bats, you are going to get a lot of baserunners and you can get into a team's bullpen quicker. Also, you get the pitcher working from the stretch a lot, and there is some evidence that this is helpful. Do those things, and a lot of good can happen. Even when the Dodgers were slumping earlier, they were getting on base a lot - it was a good omen for turning things around. Good baserunning helps - not stolen bases necessarily but taking bases where you can, avoiding mistakes.

 

With lineups - I am not sure how much protection matters (it might, but not a lot of evidence). But yeah get your best hitters as many PAs as possible and preferably as many PAs with run scoring chances. Batting your best guy either 2nd or 3rd balances those two out well.

[User Name]

I remember when Theo used to say that the best way to have a very productive lineup is to have above average hitters at every position even if you don't have superstars in any of them. That idea seems to be very accurate.

[Bellhorn04]

I think it is over-hyped as a strategy and that it factors little into run production if at all.

 

I think you and I both have the same amount of numerical evidence backing us up.

[a700hitter]

I think you and I both have the same amount of numerical evidence backing us up.

Yep, and I think managers over think a lot of stuff to no great end. There is the 1 inning closer position that everyone has incorporated into their teams. I think that is nonsense too. LaRussa batting his pitchers in the 8th hole was nothing more than idiosyncratic foolishness. The overusage of the shift in today's game does little to prevent runs. I could go on and on.

[sk7326]

Yep, and I think managers over think a lot of stuff to no great end. There is the 1 inning closer position that everyone has incorporated into their teams. I think that is nonsense too. LaRussa batting his pitchers in the 8th hole was nothing more than idiosyncratic foolishness. The overusage of the shift in today's game does little to prevent runs. I could go on and on.

 

You're right in the long run certainly ... where hitters are deployed in the long term make very little difference. However, in close games and in the sorts of situations which statistics don't really offer any insight for - being a bit platoon vulnerable can matter.

 

The 1-inning closer thing is much stupider - that is pure misuse of resources.

[jung]

The one worry about an offensive strategy that works in April and transplanting it to October is that in October you are much more likely to run into a pitching performance like Peavy's last night. The Sox get to middle relief and chew it up. Well, if there is no middle relief cause the starter took the ball all the way up to either the 8th or 9th innings...that is a problem for this Sox offense. I think it likely that the Sox have taken this far enough now to win the division. They have escaped the dreaded west coast swing and the last of the Interleague games. But I just don't know how far this team can go in the post season without a true 1 in the rotation facing teams that have a 1. Looks a little to me like last year's Orioles with less offense.

[rjortiz]

The one worry about an offensive strategy that works in April and transplanting it to October is that in October you are much more likely to run into a pitching performance like Peavy's last night. The Sox get to middle relief and chew it up. Well, if there is no middle relief cause the starter took the ball all the way up to either the 8th or 9th innings...that is a problem for this Sox offense. I think it likely that the Sox have taken this far enough now to win the division. They have escaped the dreaded west coast swing and the last of the Interleague games. But I just don't know how far this team can go in the post season without a true 1 in the rotation facing teams that have a 1. Looks a little to me like last year's Orioles with less offense.

 

I don't see the similarity. The Red Sox offense will score more runs than the Orioles did, and they have a stronger rotation. The Orioles were insanely lucky last year to make the playoffs.

[rjortiz]

I don't see us as massively behind any team in a playoff series right now. The Rays really only have one number one starter in David Price, and if Buchholz can give us 80% of what he was earlier in the year, he matches up well with him. Peavy, Lackey, Lester match up pretty well with Moore, Cobb, and Archer. The bullpens are also pretty even, but we have an advantage on offense. The Rangers have two great starters, but they'll struggle to score runs. I really don't see the A's as much as a threat.

 

The only team that really worries me is Detroit, because they arguably have four pitchers that have pitched like number ones. However, they had the pitching advantage over San Francisco last year, and still got swept. Like the Giants, I think we have a deeper roster than they do, plus the ability to score in different ways. We also have a much better defense, and our high leverage relievers are better. I also think the downgrade from Iglesias from Peralta is being overlooked. That being said, the playoffs are just too hard to predict. I don't see a clear favorite in any league.

 

Red Sox are +900 to win the whole thing. That looks like pretty good value to me. The Dodgers are +150, which is a total joke.

Edited August 26, 2013 by rjortiz

[Orange Juiced]

The math for scoring runs is very simple: Step 1: Gets lots of baserunners, Step 2: See step 1.

 

I think the math for scoring runs is actually a little different. It's not the number of base runners, it's the number of *bases*. In order to score a run, you need four bases. Those can be taken numerous ways: four walks, one home run, a double, a steal, and a sac fly, a single and a double, etc. So what you need are bases, however you can get them.

 

So Detroit and Boston have virtually identical runs scored this year: Det 662, Bos 661. But how they've gotten there is very different. Look at their two baseball-reference pages:

 

Boston: http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/BOS/2013.shtml

Detroit: http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/DET/2013.shtml

 

Boston has 12 guys with 150+ plate appearances. Only one has an ops+ of less than 100 (Middlebrooks at 84). Only one has an ops+ of greater than 150 (Ortiz at 160). Only two have an ops+ of greater than 125 (Ortiz and Carp at 143).

 

Detroit has 13 guys with 150+ plate appearances. Five have an ops+ of less than 100 (Avila - 70; Dirks - 86; Pena - 99; Kelly - 90; and Santiago - 63). Only one has an ops+ of greater than 150 (Cabrera at 202). Only two have an ops+ of greater than 125 (Cabrera and Tuiasosopo at 139).

 

So looking at these numbers, you see that the Sox have a far more balanced attack, but the Tigers seem to be more reliant upon one incredible player having a typically incredible year. But let's see this a little further.

 

Looking at their b-ref pages (click "more stats" to get these numbers), I wanted to see the total bases each team has taken. That includes their TB number from hitting, plus stolen bases and bases taken on passed balls, wild pitches, walks, groundouts, and fly outs. Here are their respective numbers:

 

Boston

- Tot Bases (hitting): 2008

- Stolen Bases: 99

- Bases Taken: 139

- TOTAL BASES: 2246 (17.02 per game)

 

Detroit

- Tot Bases (hitting): 2036

- Stolen Bases: 30

- Bases Taken: 134

- TOTAL BASES: 2200 (16.92 per game)

 

So they have produced a very similar number of bases, and a very similar number of runs, but they've gone about it in two very different ways. The Red Sox have more consistency up and down the lineup and roster, and they do a better job taking bases on the basepaths. Detroit has a shallower lineup, but they have more thump (152 hr vs. just 135 for Boston) and one all-time great hitter at the peak of his powers doing massive damage.

 

 

EDIT: Just for fun, I wanted to see how many TOTAL BASES each team averaged per run scored.

 

Bos: 3.39

Det: 3.32

 

And then I wanted to compare that to the worst scoring team in the majors, Miami:

 

Boston

- 661 runs

- 2246 TB

- 3.39 TB/R

 

Detroit

- 662 runs

- 2200 TB

- 3.32 TB/R

 

Miami

- 415 runs

- 1576 TB

- 3.80 TB/R

 

In other words, Miami has to take a lot more bases in order to score a run than either Detroit or Boston, but Detroit is a little more efficient than Boston is.

Edited August 26, 2013 by Orange Juiced

[rjortiz]

Very good post.

[sk7326]

The one worry about an offensive strategy that works in April and transplanting it to October is that in October you are much more likely to run into a pitching performance like Peavy's last night. The Sox get to middle relief and chew it up. Well, if there is no middle relief cause the starter took the ball all the way up to either the 8th or 9th innings...that is a problem for this Sox offense. I think it likely that the Sox have taken this far enough now to win the division. They have escaped the dreaded west coast swing and the last of the Interleague games. But I just don't know how far this team can go in the post season without a true 1 in the rotation facing teams that have a 1. Looks a little to me like last year's Orioles with less offense.

 

This team is much better than the 2012 Orioles - and the 2013 Orioles are also a lot better than the 2012 ones. Orioles were a .500 team which had an excellent bullpen (and we know that is unreliable year to year) and an incredibly lucky record in close games. This team has been kicking a lot of butt - and it has not been worse vs good teams ... I mean they have been around .500 against the iron, but you expect that. A team with the general approach at the plate that this team has will create opportunities for itself, even against good pitchers.

[rjortiz]

I'd also add that with the suspension of Peralta, the Tigers will be even more reliant on Cabrera to move the offense. Tuiasosopo is a part-time player, and he's likely playing way over his head. Fangraphs projects them at 4.43 R/G RoS, with the Red Sox coming in at 4.75. However, I think fangraphs is too optimistic in projecting Fielder to return to form, and too pessimistic in its projections of Middlebrooks and Bogaerts.

 

I think you'll see the Red Sox separate themselves from the rest of the league when it comes to offensive numbers.

[sk7326]

I think the math for scoring runs is actually a little different. It's not the number of base runners, it's the number of *bases*. In order to score a run, you need four bases. Those can be taken numerous ways: four walks, one home run, a double, a steal, and a sac fly, a single and a double, etc. So what you need are bases, however you can get them.

 

So Detroit and Boston have virtually identical runs scored this year: Det 662, Bos 661. But how they've gotten there is very different. Look at their two baseball-reference pages:

 

Boston: http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/BOS/2013.shtml

Detroit: http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/DET/2013.shtml

 

Boston has 12 guys with 150+ plate appearances. Only one has an ops+ of less than 100 (Middlebrooks at 84). Only one has an ops+ of greater than 150 (Ortiz at 160). Only two have an ops+ of greater than 125 (Ortiz and Carp at 143).

 

Detroit has 13 guys with 150+ plate appearances. Five have an ops+ of less than 100 (Avila - 70; Dirks - 86; Pena - 99; Kelly - 90; and Santiago - 63). Only one has an ops+ of greater than 150 (Cabrera at 202). Only two have an ops+ of greater than 125 (Cabrera and Tuiasosopo at 139).

 

So looking at these numbers, you see that the Sox have a far more balanced attack, but the Tigers seem to be more reliant upon one incredible player having a typically incredible year. But let's see this a little further.

 

Looking at their b-ref pages (click "more stats" to get these numbers), I wanted to see the total bases each team has taken. That includes their TB number from hitting, plus stolen bases and bases taken on passed balls, wild pitches, walks, groundouts, and fly outs. Here are their respective numbers:

 

Boston

- Tot Bases (hitting): 2008

- Stolen Bases: 99

- Bases Taken: 139

- TOTAL BASES: 2246 (17.02 per game)

 

Detroit

- Tot Bases (hitting): 2036

- Stolen Bases: 30

- Bases Taken: 134

- TOTAL BASES: 2200 (16.92 per game)

 

So they have produced a very similar number of bases, and a very similar number of runs, but they've gone about it in two very different ways. The Red Sox have more consistency up and down the lineup and roster, and they do a better job taking bases on the basepaths. Detroit has a shallower lineup, but they have more thump (152 hr vs. just 135 for Boston) and one all-time great hitter at the peak of his powers doing massive damage.

 

 

EDIT: Just for fun, I wanted to see how many TOTAL BASES each team averaged per run scored.

 

Bos: 3.39

Det: 3.32

 

And then I wanted to compare that to the worst scoring team in the majors, Miami:

 

Boston

- 661 runs

- 2246 TB

- 3.39 TB/R

 

Detroit

- 662 runs

- 2200 TB

- 3.32 TB/R

 

Miami

- 415 runs

- 1576 TB

- 3.80 TB/R

 

In other words, Miami has to take a lot more bases in order to score a run than either Detroit or Boston, but Detroit is a little more efficient than Boston is.

 

Lot of good stuff here, and I don't think we're that far apart. That said, while the distribution is decidedly different between Detroit and Boston, in aggregate the teams are almost truly identical offensively. Nearly identical OBPs, SLGs, runs scored, triples. One team uses more homeruns and singles, the other uses more walks and doubles - basically.

 

The total base framework, and it's not a bad one - is more forcefully argued by the difference between Detroit and Boston, two high OBP take and rake squads ... and Baltimore, 3rd in the AL in runs but with a below average team OBP, .317. They do not get many runners on at all - but they have mashed a ton of homeruns and been able to make the comparatively scant number of baserunners count. (if you also want an example of a team that could go into a teamwide funk during a crucial stretch here)

[rjortiz]

Run distribution is another component. The Tigers have a .827 OPS with RISP compared to the Orioles .783, and Boston's .763. No doubt that is pushing the Tigers toward the front when it comes to offenses.

[Orange Juiced]

Lot of good stuff here, and I don't think we're that far apart. That said, while the distribution is decidedly different between Detroit and Boston, in aggregate the teams are almost truly identical offensively. Nearly identical OBPs, SLGs, runs scored, triples. One team uses more homeruns and singles, the other uses more walks and doubles - basically.

 

The total base framework, and it's not a bad one - is more forcefully argued by the difference between Detroit and Boston, two high OBP take and rake squads ... and Baltimore, 3rd in the AL in runs but with a below average team OBP, .317. They do not get many runners on at all - but they have mashed a ton of homeruns and been able to make the comparatively scant number of baserunners count. (if you also want an example of a team that could go into a teamwide funk during a crucial stretch here)

 

Good point. And I don't now which setup is more conducive to postseason success. Cabrera is less prone to be shut down by excellent starting pitching than, say, Napoli, but pitchers are also more likely to pitch around or flat-out walk Cabrera, which means that Napoli will get a chance to do damage. I suppose both set ups have worked in the past, and both have failed in the past.

[sk7326]

Run distribution is another component. The Tigers have a .827 OPS with RISP compared to the Orioles .783, and Boston's .763. No doubt that is pushing the Tigers toward the front when it comes to offenses.

 

It is in terms of how runs are scored ... but situational hitting is not a specific skill - the OPS there is not something particularly controllable.

[rjortiz]

It is in terms of how runs are scored ... but situational hitting is not a specific skill - the OPS there is not something particularly controllable.

 

My mistake. I used the wrong term entirely. I should have said the Tigers situational hitting is helping them keep pace with the Red Sox in terms of runs scored. There can be a lot of variance over the course of a month, but in the long term, it isn't likely that the Tigers are going to continue to hit with RISP at that level. I think you'll see the Red Sox gain some separation in runs scored by the end of the year.

[User Name]

If you do some research, you'll notice an insane amount of year-to-year variance in the league's overall numbers with RISP. What you'll consistently see, however, is that the high OBP teams, due to sheer volume of RISP opportunities, tend to score more runs, even with inferior overall SLG% to the low OBP teams.

 

This lends credence to the idea that, in general, there is a direct correlation between on base ability and runs scored. A comparison between the 2013 Red Sox and Orioles is a perfect example of this.

[Dojji]

The 1-inning closer thing is much stupider - that is pure misuse of resources.

 

Disagree. The closer debate, and especially the absolute presumed truism the anti-closer side maintains, is a triumph of noise over substance.

 

The Closer model is time tested, and proven as a viable way to use your best reliever, and no other model since Tony LaRussa introduces the modern closer has proven anywhere near as effective anywhere but in theory.

 

The pro closer side can point to plenty of evidence that the closer's role itself is efficient as long as the closer reaches a certain threshold of efficiency. Not only that, but that threshold is over 80% and nearly every closer clears it, so any marginal gain over that threshold by the relief ace model is necessarily small -- tiny even. The fact that there are definitely bad closers in the world doesn't hurt their case either. If not everyone can do it, a specialist is beneficial.

 

Furthermore, the anti-closer people have to deal with the fact that their model has never worked particularly well when it was tried. And it has been tried, usually by teams desperate to stretch the viability of their average or worse pen -- the Red Sox, Tigers and Guardians are teams I can think of that tried the relief ace model or some other non-closer variant, or tried putting a stopgap in the closer's role to keep their best relief arm flexible and available for when crap goes down.

 

No team that has tried that model has gotten all the way, and the teams that have gotten the closest have done so by adopting one of their best arms as their closer by the time the playoffs start. Meanwhile teams with professional closers of all shapes and sizes get to the big show and win all the time. And what's more, teams that try the alternative methods tend to go out of their way not to have to, the following season. People remember the heroics of guys like Schilling in 2004, but I think we forget the sea change between "closer by committee" in 03 with no one really rising to the top until late in the season, compared with the job Keith Foulke did the next year.

 

Now you can make an argument that they all failed or were abandoned because the talent in the pen wasn't good enough, but the fact is that extending the usefulness of the pen is exactly what the relief ace model is supposed to do, and it has never ever ever done it in realtime, so that's more of an excuse than a real counter, and it serves to expose the fraud that the relief ace position always turns into when tried anywhere but on paper.

Edited August 26, 2013 by Dojji

[Bellhorn04]

Dojji, that post belongs in the closer thread.

[Thunder]

Dojji, that post belongs in the closer thread.

 

Way to advertise your own thread.

[Northern Star]

Couple of thread Nazis in the thread.

[sk7326]

Disagree. The closer debate, and especially the absolute presumed truism the anti-closer side maintains, is a triumph of noise over substance.

 

The Closer model is time tested, and proven as a viable way to use your best reliever, and no other model since Tony LaRussa introduces the modern closer has proven anywhere near as effective anywhere but in theory.

 

The pro closer side can point to plenty of evidence that the closer's role itself is efficient as long as the closer reaches a certain threshold of efficiency. Not only that, but that threshold is over 80% and nearly every closer clears it, so any marginal gain over that threshold by the relief ace model is necessarily small -- tiny even. The fact that there are definitely bad closers in the world doesn't hurt their case either. If not everyone can do it, a specialist is beneficial.

 

Furthermore, the anti-closer people have to deal with the fact that their model has never worked particularly well when it was tried. And it has been tried, usually by teams desperate to stretch the viability of their average or worse pen -- the Red Sox, Tigers and Guardians are teams I can think of that tried the relief ace model or some other non-closer variant, or tried putting a stopgap in the closer's role to keep their best relief arm flexible and available for when crap goes down.

 

No team that has tried that model has gotten all the way, and the teams that have gotten the closest have done so by adopting one of their best arms as their closer by the time the playoffs start. Meanwhile teams with professional closers of all shapes and sizes get to the big show and win all the time. And what's more, teams that try the alternative methods tend to go out of their way not to have to, the following season. People remember the heroics of guys like Schilling in 2004, but I think we forget the sea change between "closer by committee" in 03 with no one really rising to the top until late in the season, compared with the job Keith Foulke did the next year.

 

Now you can make an argument that they all failed or were abandoned because the talent in the pen wasn't good enough, but the fact is that extending the usefulness of the pen is exactly what the relief ace model is supposed to do, and it has never ever ever done it in realtime, so that's more of an excuse than a real counter, and it serves to expose the fraud that the relief ace position always turns into when tried anywhere but on paper.

 

Foulke was not a 1-inning closer and Francona deployed him in the 7th inning when the outs got very important in the ALCS. The Pirates of the early 90s worked quite successfully with a lot of reliever with a lot of saves. That closers matter is fair - that your best reliever be charged with a relatively adversity free situation is not. The relief ace is not an argument against the closer - but an argument against keeping him in a glass case while letting inferior pitchers get bigger outs in earlier spots in the game. The 2003 Red Sox did not identify a relief ace - Grady drew names out of a hat. Francona identified a relief ace - Foulke and treated him like one. Old timey baseball like Rich Gossage, Dick Radatz, Mike Marshall seemed to figure it out reasonably well - this is not new so much as a refutation of an idea which makes pitching staffs much too large and saddle (especially) NL benches who need all the viable hitters they can get.