There were other problems, though - the Bradley trade and the terrible bullpen.
What analytics could possible have pointed in the direction of signing Diekman, for example.
Strictly from a cost-benefit standpoint, starting 2023 with a DH platoon of Hosmer & Dalbec doesn't seem like the worst thing. They can also back up Casas of course.
And spend the money elsewhere.
The point is it looks like data analysis did absolutely nothing for the Sox this year. So what exactly are the benefits? It's a serious question.
(One possible answer is that every team has data coming out of their ears now, so no one has an advantage any more.)
Usually when someone hits a curveball, expert analysis concludes that it was a "hanger".
And when someone hits a slider it's concluded that it was a "cement mixer".
I have to think they only traded Betts because they believed there was no way he was staying in Boston after 2020. I don't think the Boston Red Sox trade a relatively young Hall of Famer solely for short-term payroll and tax relief. I sure hope not, anyway.
An article in the Globe suggests Astros GM James Click may not be back next year. His contract hasn't been renewed and the scuttlebutt is there are bad feelings between him and Astros owner Jim Crane.
It can also backfire, of course, as it may have with Tatis Jr.
And the Dodgers might be relieved they didn't do it with Bellinger.
As with just about everything there are benefits and risks.
Didn't work very well for the Dodgers and Mets this year, in spite of enormous payrolls and great regular seasons.
You've got the Crapshoot Factor on top of everything else.
It's a tricky game.
2022 is our Year 1 for tax. We didn't pay tax for 2021.
So 2023 would be Year 2.
2024 would be the Scramble to Get Back Under year.
Just like they paid tax for 2018 and 2019 and scrambled to get under for 2020.
Regardless of financial loss, if you keep going over the tax limits there are talent penalties too, which are not to be taken lightly. It's a pretty tough system to beat.