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Bellhorn04

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Everything posted by Bellhorn04

  1. So you're saying that over the course of the season, the maximum number of situations that call for a sac bunt are 5?
  2. Baseball seems to be the only sport where fans and analysts keep thinking of all these ways to build a better mousetrap.
  3. In truth I don't really disagree very much with any of what you're saying. I just always seem to find a counterpoint I can argue, the devil's advocate thing. I think I also have a tendency to look at things from the manager's perspective, to assume he's got some sort of thought process behind what he's doing.
  4. Kimmi, the numbers in this article are averages for all games including blowouts. The inclusion of blowouts is why the average leverage factor goes down slightly in the top of the 9th. If it's a one-run game, the leverage factor will be higher in the top of the 9th than in the top of the 8th.
  5. I agree, but again it's a case where the manager can't do this as much as he'd like to. Otherwise the closer will get burned out. It's a long season. I think Dojji made a good point. If you don't have more than 2 relievers you can trust to put up zeros consistently you're pretty much screwed no matter what you do. If you have a bullpen like KC you have a guy like Herrera you can bring in for one of those 7th inning jams, and you still have a Madson and a Davis out there behind him.
  6. She posted on Feb 9 so she's been absent from the board for one day so far.
  7. I said it's just one way to look at it. Just trying to add to the conversation, that's all. You know it's impossible to definitely prove one way or the other.
  8. Well, major league teams only scored an average of 3.95 earned runs a game in 2015, so the management of pitching seems to be pretty effective overall. Just one way to look at it.
  9. This would mean that, hypothetically, the closer would have to be prepared to come in the game any time from the 6th inning on, maybe even earlier. That could be beneficial in one particular game, but over the course of the season I'm not sure it would work out so well.
  10. He's correct, the leverage factor is higher on average in the 9th because the Win Probability factor for the team that's ahead keeps getting higher as the number of remaining outs decreases.
  11. Not me. I still hold out hope for him.
  12. I also heard that E-Rod has figured out his pitch-tipping thing and it's fixed. It's a beautiful time of year.
  13. That's a good example, so maybe we can say Larussa bought into part of the optimal order theory. But when I look at the game logs of the 2011 postseason, Larussa's last hurrah, he had Furcal hitting leadoff, after a .298 OBP season, and of course Pujols in the 3 spot. So he didn't follow the theory very systematically.
  14. And one of them is just plain Chris Young.
  15. But what specific examples are there of LaRussa's optimization?
  16. Of course, if all managers adopted lineup optimization, nobody would be any further ahead, relatively speaking. So what's the point?
  17. I think most tinkering is done when teams aren't scoring though, not when they are.
  18. I think that the real problem may be with the players more so than the managers. It's pretty much common knowledge that baseball players in general do not react well to stuff that might mess up their heads in the slightest way. I know that Pedroia did some grumbling about hitting leadoff back in 2008. If I recall correctly his main complaint was that he felt like he was trying to alter his normal hitting approach, because there was a bit more pressure on him to draw walks and get on base. And his numbers were awful.
  19. There are psychological factors in baseball that can never be measured or explained. With regard to the batting order, one thing that always sticks out in my head is what happened in 2008 when Ellsbury was going through a rough stretch leading off. Tito tried Pedroia at leadoff and then he tried Drew. Pedroia had a .520 OPS in 17 games. His overall OPS for the year was .869. Drew had a .596 OPS in 8 games. His overall OPS for the year was .927. Meanwhile Ellsbury put up big numbers hitting at the bottom of the lineup and finally got his old spot back.
  20. Looks like Fred Lynn should have been the leadoff hitter on the 1978 team.
  21. The only logical explanation for this is that it will still happen a lot in the first inning, even with high OBP guys hitting first and second.
  22. This would be Jerry Remy on the 1978 team. And the leadoff hitter that year was Burleson, who had the worst OBP on the entire team.
  23. This is the part that still baffles me a little. If you did put high OBP guys in the first two spots, would the #3 hitter still come up with 2 outs and 0 on more than any other position?
  24. But from quick research I've done on the career splits of leadoff hitter types vs. 3/4 hitter types, the leadoff hitter is going to have a much higher % of PA's with nobody on base. It looks like about 60% vs. about 50%. Which makes sense because the leadoff hitter is guaranteed to have one PA with nobody on every single game.
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