Jayhawk Bill

Cabrera is the the other essential piece if the Twins are dealing with the Yankees, and Cabrera + Hughes > Santana IMVHO, salary considerations included. It's more likely Cabrera + Hughes + one versus Crisp + Lester + two right now, and I'd be happy to see Boston lose the deal at that point.

Possibly, but between then and now there will have been a tornado somewhere in the Great Plains in which pigs will have flown, too. If available, discounting Yankees as irrelevant: 1) Brandon Webb 2) Scott Kazmir 3) Jake Peavy 4) Johan Santana I'd give up Crisp, Lester and change....exactly what Theo is offering.

What's the future of these three Yankees? Ian Kennedy: Fourth starter. Check the MLB Pitch F/X for Kennedy's games: he doesn't have great control. The umpires gave him calls outside the zone that they weren't giving the opposing pitchers--that's why he did well. Consider that baseball fans are getting savvy regarding how to detect such blatant bias, and add in his low velocity, and there's only one guy with that skill set who succeeded in MLB--the rest washed out around age 30. As will Kennedy...but 'til then he's a fourth starter. Melky Cabrera: All Star-caliber outfielder. He's got a right fielder's arm, range just shy of Coco Crisp's (equivalent RZR, with Crisp making about 20 more out-of-zone plays than Melky could've in the same number of innings), and the potential to turn into a HOF-caliber player (his PECOTA comparables include Tony Gwynn, Pete Rose and Carl Yastrzemski, as well as other HOF-caliber players). Melky is very young to be playing as a regular CF for the New York Yankees. He's going to be getting better for half a decade, and he's four years from free agency and one year away from arb. Phil Hughes: Two-out-of-three chance he blows out his arm before age 24. If he doesn't, we're talking Cy Young-caliber pitching; if his arm makes it to age 26, we're talking HOF mention; if his arm makes it to age 32, we're talking HOF. If Hughes stays healthy, he's BETTER than Johan Santana within three years, IMO. Upside like that from an MLB-minimum pitcher is high value stuff. Every MLB team is constrained by payroll. The Yankees have a big one, but there are limits: last I checked, the Yankees put roughly 70% of their revenues into player payroll, a higher percentage than any other MLB team. Santana and Rowand together will cost $30-40 million a year next year--that's a whole lot more than Cabrera and Hughes and Kennedy will cost. Nope. If the Yankees lose Melky Cabrera and either Chamberlain or Hughes to get Santana I'll be happy. Just as I'd be happy to land him for Crisp plus Lester plus two. :thumbsup:

Some days back I posited that the Santana value would be roughly Crisp + Lester + two others, just as it's being reported this morning. That's maybe, possibly, a win for Boston, but it's close. It's certainly a win for the Twins, who get 20 years of talent for one year of Santana. Melky Cabrera and Phil Hughes and Ian Kennedy??? If that trade is made, look for it to go down in history as the trade that doomed the Yankees.

As promised, back to that issue of whether Johan Santana is likely to resemble Mike Mussina going forward in time. It's hard gauging where Santana will end up, because his performance from ages 25-27 was so good. The 2007 PECOTA looked just three years back (if I understand the system correctly), looking only at those prime years, and it considered these pitchers the 20-best comparables to Santana: Rank / Name / Comparable year to Santana's 2007 / Comparability Score 1 Sandy Koufax 1964 54 2 Tom Seaver 1973 50 3 Steve Carlton 1973 48 4 Mario Soto 1984 41 5 Camilo Pascual 1962 36 6 Roger Clemens 1990 36 7 Don Sutton 1973 35 8 Kevin Appier 1996 35 9 Fergie Jenkins 1971 35 10 Juan Marichal 1966 33 11 Jose Rijo 1993 32 12 Hal Newhouser 1949 31 13 Luis Tiant 1969 31 14 Carl Erskine 1955 30 15 Billy Pierce 1955 29 16 Floyd Bannister 1983 29 17 Jim Bunning 1960 28 18 David Cone 1991 28 19 Sam McDowell 1971 27 20 Javier Vazquez 2004 25 Wow. Now we have three Hall of Fame pitchers topping the list. But we have concerns, too: Koufax had only two MLB years left after 1964. Soto had just one good season after 1984, if you can call a 12-15 record good. Pascual had two more good seasons before his annual IP dropped by 100 per year (although the quality of those IP approached his previous value). Clemens had only two good years left between 1990 and when he left the Red Sox in 1996, not long after meeting Jose Canseco and seeing his strikeout numbers begin to magically return to the levels of his halcyon youth. Appier essentially lost three seasons to injury one year after 1996. Rijo had 26 good starts left after 1993 Newhouser went downhill immediately after 1949. El Tiante more than doubled his ERA from 1968 to 1969, and it took him two more years to resolve his injury issues and emerge as a great starter again in 1972. Erskine wasn't that great to start with and he declined fast. Bannister immediately spent five years as roughly a 4.00-ERA pitcher after 1983, whereupon he collapsed. McDowell completely collapsed right after 1971. Javier Vazquez had three years of oddly-inflated ERAs starting in 2004. By my count, that's 12 concerns out of 20 comparables. The other eight pitchers stayed close to their established performance level for seven more years. Eight-twentieths is 40%, just a shade higher than the rough estimate I ran using Nate Silver's research a few posts back. And that's using Santana's three best years to forecast his entire future. We don't yet have a PECOTA that considers his dip in 2007. Using his whole career, he's comparable to a different level of pitcher, one of whom is Mike Mussina. Let's contrast Johan Santana and Mike Mussina's careers, side-by-side, through age 35, using WARP1: Age Santana Mussina 21 1.3 22 0.6 3.3 23 5.0 9.8 24 6.8 4.4 25 11.8 7.6 26 9.7 9.3 27 10.8 7.4 28 9.1 8.1 29 [b]9.7[/b] 8.2 30 [b]9.2[/b] 8.1 31 [b]8.8[/b] 8.9 32 [b]8.3[/b] 10.5 33 [b]7.9[/b] 8.0 34 [b]7.5[/b] 9.7 35 [b]7.1[/b] 4.8 Those numbers from Santana's future come from assigning Mussina's average value from ages 29-35 to Santana's age 32 and assigning a reasonable decline curve on either side. This is what I see Johan Santana achieving if he remains injury-free. That's a 2008 season roughly as good as his 2005 season, and a slow decline from there. That's really good pitching. With Boston, that'll make Johan Santana a HOF candidate. But not a lock. *** In summary, I think that too many are projecting Johan Santana based upon his 2004-2006 stats. Using his whole career, I see him as slightly less valuable, but still a very good pitcher. I caution that, even using best-case comparables, most pitchers don't go seven years without serious injury.

Comparability score was designed by Bill James. I called him to get a response*; he says that your opinion is useless. The fact remains, for the past four years, he's only been the best pitcher in one league--not necessarily both--by professional opinion two out of four years. He hasn't swept the Cy Young Award four years straight: he's won it twice, 2004 and 2006. In 2005 he finished third in the AL Cy Young voting. In 2007, our most recent data point, he finished in a four-way tie for fifth with exactly one third-place vote. But is the issue run support, as you suggest? Let's check stats: Year / Santana's Run Support / (Difference from AL average) 2004 5.20 (-.19) 2005 4.47 (-.29) 2006 5.23 (+.26) 2007 4.44 (-.46) Certainly Santana does better in Cy Young Award voting when he gets more run support. But over the four-year stretch you're citing, his run support is, overall, only a couple of tenths of a run below AL average. That's a trivial difference, accounting for only a win or so each year, not another four per year. But while we're checking strength of support, shouldn't we check strength of opposition? Here's where Santana ranked among AL pitchers with 150+ IP regarding quality of opposition batters, using OPS as the metric: 2004 40th of 40 2005 42nd of 49 2006 9th of 41 2007 19th of 44 OK, this kinda puts things into perspective. In two of Santana's three seasons contending for the AL Cy Young Award, he faced bottom-of-the-barrel AL Central hitting. In 2006 the AL Central hitting got good--but Santana had better-than-average run support that year, too. In 2007 Santana was a good pitcher, but not really a Cy Young contender--and that was while facing average, not strong, opposition hitting. From there you move on to suggest that a pitcher who's just 28 and has "dominated" for four seasons will be as good for another 5-6 more years. That's incorrect. There are those who claim that pitchers peak very young, in their early 20's: certainly a great number of Cy Young winners were under 26 years of age. Other analysts claim that good pitchers peak as late as age 28. In no case, however, does any professional suggest that a pitcher's peak is 29-34. Even avoiding injury, the best is almost certainly past, not yet to come. But let's look at that injury thing. Here's a graph from BP regarding career-threatening injury frequency by age for MLB pitchers, along with some words of explanation: http://www.baseballprospectus.com/news/images/20030226_01_silver.gif Over a seven-year contract, Johan Santana will face roughly a 15% shot of an injury that will end his career or substantially decrease his value each season. Assuming 85% per year, let's look at the cumulative chance he'll avoid serious injury: Year Chance 1 85% 2 72% 3 61% 4 52% 5 44% 6 38% 7 32% This isn't just decline with age as he passes his prime--this is the chance that his arm will be seriously injured. Consider decline with age as well, and the chances that he'll be "the best pitcher in baseball" or "dominate" for another 5-6 years look very slim. Especially given that he wasn't even a Cy Young contender in 2007, and that his fastball has dropped to 92 mph. He doesn't look like an inner-circle HOF pitcher any more. He still looks good--he looks like he'll go, maybe, 31-17 over the next two years with a 3.50 ERA in 410 IP. Just as Mike Mussina did at ages 29 and 30. * OK, I didn't really call Bill James. I was using absurdity to make a point two ways: first, the language that you direct at me is returned to you; second, there's considerable hubris involved with calling another poster's objective professional reference "useless," with the implication that one's own amateur opinion is better. If you disagree with me, fine, do so--but there's no need to insult either Bill James or me.

I checked Johan Santana's most comparable pitchers through age 28 at Baseball Reference. Guess who shows up sixth? Name (Similarity score) Tim Hudson (949) Roy Oswalt (940) John Candelaria (935) Juan Pizarro (931) Bob Welch (929) Mike Mussina (928) Kevin Appier (927) Jack McDowell (921) Kevin Millwood (915) Sid Fernandez (915) Something else to note: none of the ten pitchers most comparable to Johan Santana at age 28 have yet made it into the Hall of Fame. A whole bunch burned out early; a few are still active. I've got to run, but I wanted to give you a quick answer. More later...but I'm not as far off base as you seemed to speculate.

Take away: George Kelley: First baseman, fewer than 2,000 hits, fewer than 150 HR, under a .300 batting average, and a career OPS+ of just 109. Lloyd Waner: An outfielder with a career OPS+ of 99. Jesse Haines: Career ERA+ of 108, never led a league in any significant pitching category (wins, strikeouts, or ERA). Add: Dwight Evans: One of the few best right fielders in MLB history; 56th-best all-time hitter in runs created (for years the highest rank on that list of any HOF-eligible player not yet inducted). Bert Blyleven: Best eligible pitcher not in the HOF. Fifth all-time in strikeouts; eighth in shutouts; tenth in career ERA; 26th in wins. Ron Santo: Gold glove defender and power hitter who was the best OBP man of the second deadball era.

I'd consider Ellsbury for Santana, straight up, if Santana then signed a 7/128 contract (which it's rumored is his actual demand to sign with the Twins). I would not do Ellsbury-for-Santana if Santana wants a 5/125 deal. I wouldn't trade both Ellsbury and Lester for Santana. Frankly, I think that Johan Santana's career will look like Mike Mussina's from here on out. Mussina is a marginal HOF candidate, but Santana is being regarded as a future HOF lock by many. I don't think that he's that good. *** A six-man rotation has three obvious drawbacks: 1) Underuse of Josh Beckett; 2) A requirement that Terry Francona count higher than the fingers on one hand; and 3) The use of an extra roster spot. That last one is the big one. Conversely, it saves all of the starting pitchers' innings counts down, and it would be very likely to help both Daisuke Matsuzaka and Tim Wakefield (check his 2007 splits).

Why does forcing him to pitch in AAA instead of MLB for the exact same number of innings protect him from wearing down early? Clay Buchholz is probably better than whomever else might be Boston's fifth starter, and both Kyle Snyder and Julian Tavarez are around for long relief if Buchholz can only go five innings. Why not let our best five starting pitchers start in MLB?

I was going to say 150 innings pitched, but if you've claimed 150 IP I'll get aggressive and predict 151 IP. Predicting a 20% increase is normal overall, but I regard it as too aggressive for Clay Buchholz given his age and build. But here I disagree. Those 150 IP are going to be really, really good innings. Let's not waste them--let's have Buchholz on a strict 100-pitch limit and start him as the fifth starter, missing turns now and then to keep the others on their proper days.

Before the season, Johan Santana was considered to be a 94 mph fastball pitcher. http://feeds.foxsports.com/mlb/playerScouting?categoryId=85229 His last game of the season, Santana fastest pitch was 92.1 mph. His fastball was, as you post, in the 90-92 range. http://gd2.mlb.com/components/game/mlb/year_2007/month_09/day_26/gid_2007_09_26_minmlb_detmlb_1/inning/ He has seemed to lose about two miles per hour off his fastball through the course of 2007. It might be back next spring, but there is some evidence for a slight loss of velocity.

...or stay with the excellent talent base that the Red Sox already have. Austin Jackson is a product of speed and high BABIP who might or might not translate to MLB, but Hughes and Melky Cabrera are, together, probably more valuable than Johan Santana. Santana is an exceptional pitcher, but there are limits to his value.

Something I just realized: Today's NY Times featured an article regarding the Mitchell Report and how players determined to have lied about past PED use could be denied visas. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/sports/baseball/25chass.html?ei=5088&en=e7ede9320f535c0d&ex=1353646800&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=all While everybody immediately associates the Dominican Republic with steroids, the biggest issue may be with Venezuela: http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/mariners/2003404352_steroids12.html This doesn't mean that every player from Venezuela used steroids: one might look for players whose performance suddenly surged in the middle of their pro careers for the biggest suspects. Players don't normally go from, say, unprotected Rule 5 draft picks to Cy Young Award winners. *** It's certainly far less than proof...but the timing of Santana's availability and the upcoming release of the Mitchell Report may not be entirely coincidental.

Do you know Graziano? Have you read his work? :dunno: I've read him occasionally. He's average, IMO--but he makes a good point regarding the Twins and their history of surprising folks by going for lower-level, higher-upside prospects. That's an impressive list quoted previously. Most systems deal mostly in MLB-ready prospects. Minnesota has shown a tendency to do otherwise in the past decade. *** bosoxnation07, while I appreciate your advice, look at how the post used the quote. While respectfully disagreeing with another poster, I pointed out that his blanket statement of how the world worked wasn't universally shared. If this forum universally accepts blanket statements by established posters as trumping documented patterns of behavior described by published authors in the field--regardless of where they are quoted--then there's little merit to continuing to search for discussion. If the forum has difficulty accepting MLB Trade Rumors on-site rumors as gospel, I certainly understand--but also understand that in this case I'm merely taking past tendencies cited there into consideration, and that the core of my position (Crisp+Lester+two) was from the Boston Herald. As an aside, if you want to offer constructive advice in the future, please PM me. It's too easy to misconstrue your approach here as a public insult.

http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2007/11/graziano-on-a-y.html I'm new here, but you obviously know a lot about Boston's MiLB system. I don't dispute that your difference with some of my thoughts reflects best conventional wisdom: please understand that I'm disagreeing based upon research, not mere fantasy, and that I understand that Minnesota might end up going for MLB/AAA-level talent if they trade Santana.

OK, I missed this post the first time around. When RobZombie quoted it, I took a moment and checked to see what Shane Jensen had against Mike Lowell. Here's what I deduced: 1) SAFE is a ZR-type stat. There are two types of fielding stats, those that count accomplishments and those that look at rates. SAFE looks at rates. 2) The years covered were 2002-2005. Lowell's years in Boston were excluded from the analysis. In his last four years in Florida, Mike Lowell made "lots" of plays every year except 2003, where almost every metric shows him to be below average. The other years the Marlins' ground-ball pitching staff made both Mike Lowell and Alex Gonzalez look like Gold Glove-caliber fielders despite mediocre Zone Ratings. Both men excelled in double plays started, a factor not considered in most fielding metrics, but in other areas they were roughly average in rate stats, albeit superior in counting stats. In 2005, two things happened: Mike Lowell stopped taking steroids*, and he won his first Gold Glove. His range increased as his power hitting numbers dropped. The difference in 2005 was marginal, but his rate of starting double plays skyrocketed by over 40%, suggesting improved quickness. In 2006, and again in 2007, Mike Lowell was rated third in MLB by RZR. In previous years, even 2005, he had been below-average in RZR. The big shift suggests a change in capability--a change not reflected in Shane Jensen's SAFE, which ends in 2005. I agree that Lowell is better at the aspects of defense detailed above, bunts and drives down the line. I disagree that he's below-average as a third baseman: looking at 2006-2007, he's among the better defenders at the hot corner. * With the start of steroid testing in 2005, Mike Lowell requested, and was denied, a theraputic use exemption to allow him to continue taking medically prescribed steroids that he had been taking since his cancer surgery.

I'd understand your trying to close debate if you'd found a quote from Minnesota's Front Office to that effect. Given that you haven't, and that the foundation for my analysis regarding Crisp plus Lester plus two others is a published Boston Herald article (previously linked), I don't see any immediate reason to cease considering my posts as reasonable. I'll certainly agree that Boston might give either Buchholz or Ellsbury to Minnesota for Santana. I wouldn't support either move, though, unless it were Ellsbury and little else of value for a seven-year commitment from Santana. The latest benchmark contract for a pitcher is Barry Zito's 7/126. Santana's agent has apparently indicated that he'd take that. Here's a posted quote of the Gammons reference you're citing: “Even with a new ballpark (set to open in 2009), I don’t see them being able to keep him because it’s going to take $25 million and he’s not going to sign before he tests the market a year from now. So, I think you go out there and try to get a young pitcher and two position players…I understand (the idea of keeping him, and trading him at next year’s deadline), but history has shown that trade-deadline deals have not brought as much as winter deals, which is why I think they have to explore it now…The question is going to be, does anybody have two players to trade to get him. I can see Anaheim, I can see the Dodgers, but I’m not sure I see other teams having enough to get him.” http://www.metsblog.com/2007/11/02/quote-gammons-on-johan-santanas-future/ This doesn't make sense. One year of Johan Santana at final-year arb rates isn't worth anything like a young pitcher and two position players. No other MLB pitcher has commanded anything approaching $25 million per annum in a guaranteed multi-year deal--that's because GMs know that pitchers are more fragile than position players.* Trade deadline deals often bring MORE than winter deals, because contending teams are desperate for a particular player and it's a seller's market. Peter Gammons made his reputation when I was young through having the best connections and doing the best research. In recent years he's taken to pontificating without regard for the possibility of harming his reputation were he proven wrong, maybe because he's already enshrined in Cooperstown. He's not citing sources here, and his opinions seem badly out of line with current player values. In any case, I disagree with Gammons here. Regarding the "need" to pay Beckett more if Santana were to be paid more...I don't think so. That's why they call it a "contract." * Top pitcher salaries, source USA Today: Bartolo Colon $16,000,000 Andy Pettitte $16,000,000 Jason Schmidt $15,703,946 Mike Hampton $14,500,000 Pedro Martinez $14,002,234 Roger Clemens was paid at a rate of about $25,000,000 per complete season in 2007, but the contract was only for roughly two-thirds of the season. Multi-year deals are different, because the team accepts (or insures for) the risk of players' performances declining due to injury, lifestyle or aging in the later years.

I may have misunderstood your point earlier. If your point is that MLB GMs may be underestimating Buchholz's value, you may be correct. Note that I threw him out of my analysis. If I'd included Buchholz, he alone would be worth more than seven years of Johan Santana. I'll give you the whole sequence of MLE computations if you want, but Clay Buchholz comes out to something around a 50 VORP pitcher in 2007 if you count his MiLB time at the appropriate discounted value. That's roughly the value of Roy Halladay. But Roy Halladay is old, and Buchholz is young; Roy Halladay is expensive, and Clay Buchholz practically plays for free by Boston payroll standards. I'll say what you haven't said: in a Santana trade, unless Boston knows something about Buchholz's health that we don't, Buchholz should be untouchable. As good as Santana is, has been, and will be, I'll take Buchholz at $400,000 over Santana at $18 million.

Cheez, I dunno...he's a relief pitcher, good for 75 IP at a 3.50 ERA give or take, and he's guaranteed starting pitcher money for four years? It seems a little steep to me...YMMV.

Would it make a difference if I used the win values of both players and salaries? Payroll dollars can buy more wins. I'm putting everything into dollar figures for comparison...I could denominate what I'm saying in wins, instead. Either way it's roughly a breakeven, once you consider the added value of concentration of talent, and it might tilt in Boston's favor given that star players are exceptionally valuable to teams that can afford higher payrolls. Our position doesn't differ much, just our methods and perspectives.

Example1, I'm not sure that I'd agree with that. A player's value is the value of his expected contributions over the duration of his contract less the value of the money he'll have to be paid. The value of expected contributions goes up once a player is established in MLB, but so does the salary that he'll have to be paid. Let's look at your example, Josh Beckett. Beckett has just come off two consecutive 200+ IP seasons, and he's past his 26th birthday. Both of these data points suggest that the questions regarding his durability in his youth are pretty much answered. His ERA was always good; it's still good. Toss in the renewed reputation as a "big game" pitcher, and Beckett's expected contributions per year over the duration of his contract are higher than they've ever been. Nonetheless, I'd consider Beckett's value lower than it was in, say, November 2003, for two reasons: 1) Beckett is only obligated for three more years right now. After 2003 he was obligated for four more years. 2) Beckett will be paid $32 million over the next three years, plus $1.5 million amortized signing bonus. He was paid only a shade under $15 million for the four years 2004-2007, roughly half as much as he'll make in the next three years. For most players (NOT, IMO, Beckett, for reasons I described above) there's also an increased risk of injury with age, even for players as young as their late 20's and early 30's. That's another big factor reducing the value of older players...but the years of obligated service and the lower price of pre-arb years and arb years in contrast to free agency years are the primary reasons that I often see greater value in younger players. *** Let's try to apply this to Johan Santana. First, I see no reason to discount the pre-season PECOTA projections for Santana one iota given his past season. His HR/FB was up a little; his IFFB% was down; his K/BB ratio was just a little bit down. To me, Santana looks to be the same pitcher that he was in November 2006. Accordingly, I'm taking his 2007 PECOTA as his new 2008 projection, his 2008 projection as his new 2009 projection, and so on, right through taking his 2011 projection as his new 2012-2014 projection. By that, how much is Santana worth? Year WARP MORP 2008 8.1 $28,075,000 2009 7.1 $24,950,000 2010 6.2 $21,800,000 2011 5.0 $17,375,000 2012 5.0 $18,925,000 2013 5.0 $20,439,000 2014 5.0 $22,074,120 41.4 $153,638,120 He's worth about $154 million. The word on the street (http://www.startribune.com/twins/story/1566916.html) is that Santana wants something along the lines of Zito's 7/126 contract. If true, that means that Johan Santana has about $30 million in trade value, assuming that a ballclub has the cash flow and risk tolerance to sign him to a 7/126 deal. How much do the Twins want? Again, the word on the street (http://www.bostonherald.com/sports/baseball/red_sox/view.bg?articleid=1046361) is that a realistic package would be Coco Crisp, Lester or Buchholz, another "proven MLB talent" and another prospect. There's big variance on what Coco Crisp is worth, just as there are questions regarding Lester. Let's do what we did with Santana and take their straight 2007 PECOTA projections as if they were current, i.e. displacing everything by one year: Jon Lester Year WARP MORP 2008 2.2 $4,200,000 2009 2.1 $4,250,000 2010 2.1 $4,625,000 2011 2.2 $5,300,000 2012 1.9 $4,750,000 10.5 $23,125,000 Coco Crisp Year WARP MORP 2008 4.9 $13,425,000 2009 4.7 $13,725,000 2010 4.2 $12,600,000 13.8 $39,750,000 Jon Lester will be paid about $800,000 the next two years and about $9 million in salary through his arb years if he does as well as projected...call it $10 million total. Coco is due $18.5 million through three years if his 2010 option is exercised, as it probably will be. Rounding, Coco and Lester are worth about $35 million. An established MLB player could be Alex Cora or Julian Tavarez, both worth roughly their contract value. An unnamed prospect would probably not be a top ten name: call it a player worth one or two million. It's still roughly the same calculus: Minnesota ends up winning the four-for-one trade. Except... Four names occupy four roster slots, and, frankly, replacement level talent for Boston should be a little bit higher than replacement-level talent for Minnesota.* If we assume that the replacement-level player for the other slots made available by this trade are really 1.0 WARP players, guys who earn one more win for their team than an average AAA call-up over the course of 162 games, then Boston "wins" the trade, too. I'd make the trade. YMMV. * Those of you still suffering mental anguish and paying therapists by the hour as a result of the 2005 bullpen, the 2006 starting rotation, and Matt Clement's career in Boston should understand that "should be" is not necessarily equivalent to "is."