Yirsandy Rodríguez

The Boston Red Sox arrived in the Bronx needing answers. They left with more questions. Following Sunday’s 6–1 loss to the Yankees, the Red Sox now sit at 27–36 and occupy last place in the American League East. They have lost four of five games against New York this season. Still, even in the middle of another difficult afternoon for Boston, one familiar constant stood out: Willson Contreras kept producing. The veteran first baseman lined a 110-mph RBI double to drive in Boston’s only run. It was far from an ordinary hit. Of the six runs the Red Sox scored across the entire series in New York, four were driven in by Contreras. And that small sample tells much of the story of his season. While the Red Sox continue searching for collective solutions, Contreras has become one of the team’s few certainties. More than that, he is putting together the best offensive season of his career and, quietly, has placed himself among the best first basemen in Major League Baseball. When Boston targeted Contreras over the winter, the expectation was stability, experience, and power in the middle of the lineup. What they have gotten is much more than that. Among first basemen with at least 200 plate appearances, Contreras is firmly in every relevant conversation. Metric Value MLB Rank wRC+ 155 4th wOBA .405 T-2nd xwOBA .400 T-2nd OBP .394 2nd SLG .540 4th WAR 2.2 4th The only first basemen ahead of him in WAR entering Sunday were Ben Rice, Matt Olson, and Nick Kurtz. That means Contreras has been more valuable overall than names like Freddie Freeman, Bryce Harper, Pete Alonso, Vladimir Guerrero Jr., and Christian Walker. On its own, that is striking. But in Boston’s context, it is even more significant. A look at the Red Sox offense makes that reality impossible to ignore: Contreras is operating in a completely different tier than the rest of the roster. Red Sox Offensive Leaders (Entering Week of June 8) Player wRC+ Willson Contreras 155 Ceddanne Rafaela 115 Wilyer Abreu 113 Nick Sogard 102 Mickey Gasper 104 Connor Wong 99 Roman Anthony 93 Jarren Duran 84 The gap between Contreras and Boston’s second-best regular hitter is 40 points of wRC+. That is massive. Even more revealing are the offensive metrics that best capture run creation. Player OBP SLG wOBA Willson Contreras .394 .540 .405 Ceddanne Rafaela .345 .431 .345 Wilyer Abreu .346 .430 .342 Jarren Duran .278 .401 .299 No other Sox hitter is even close to those numbers. While much of the lineup has gone through ups and downs, Contreras has maintained consistent, All-Star level production. That helps explain why he comfortably leads the team in offensive value. Player FanGraphs Offensive Runs (Off) Willson Contreras 15.3 Ceddanne Rafaela 3.9 Wilyer Abreu 3.3 Jarren Duran -2.1 Contreras has generated nearly four times the offensive value of any other Boston hitter. That is not a normal gap — it is the kind that usually exists between a star and the rest of the roster. The most interesting part: it is not about better discipline. When a 34-year-old produces the best offensive season of his career, the usual explanation points to improved pitch selection or better plate discipline. But the numbers tell a different story. Contreras is not chasing fewer pitches outside the strike zone. In fact, he is swinging at more pitches outside the zone than last year. He is also striking out slightly more. On the surface, that should be a negative trend. But what has changed is not how often he swings, it is what happens when he makes contact. Let's look at this graph showing the average exit speeds in different parts of the area: His average exit velocity across different parts of the zone shows real damage: over 102 mph in the inner lower-outside area, and consistently above 92 mph across all in-zone locations. That level of impact explains why his barrel rate has climbed to 15.1%, the best mark of his career. His .242 ISO is also his highest in recent seasons. And perhaps most importantly, the expected metrics fully support the results. Metric Value wOBA .405 xwOBA .400 SLG .540 xSLG .537 Barrel Rate 15.10% ISO .242 Perhaps the most telling number is strike rate. In 2025, Contreras saw strikes on 50.8% of pitches. In 2026, that number has dropped to 44.8%. Pitchers are attacking him differently, giving him fewer opportunities to do damage. He is being shown more respect and he is still producing. That is what happens when a hitter crosses the line between dangerous and unavoidable — someone who forces opposing teams to change their entire approach. Boston’s first two months of the season have been defined by losses, inconsistency, and unanswered questions. Willson Contreras’ season has been the opposite. If anyone is keeping this team afloat, it's him. View full article

On Thursday at Fenway Park, Brayan Bello threw five innings, allowed seven hits, eight earned runs, walked three and struck out four. He was optioned to Triple-A Worcester later that same night. It was not the first time Baltimore had done this to him: back in April, the Orioles tagged him for 13 hits and five home runs in a single start. Thursday’s nightmare began in the first inning. Taylor Ward opened the game with a double on the very first pitch and scored on Adley Rutschman’s first-inning single. Leody Taveras drove in the second run with another base hit. Then came Coby Mayo, whose bases-clearing double broke the game open in one swing: three runs, a 5-0 score. Ward capped the inning with a single that brought Mayo home for the sixth run. Six runs. Twelve batters. Forty pitches. An inning that said everything. Bello managed to get through four more innings, but the damage had already been done. In the fifth, Baltimore added two more runs — a Samuel Basallo double and a Colton Cowser sacrifice fly — extending the lead to 8-0, which proved more than enough. Afterward, Bello said he felt healthy, that his mentality was the same whether he was starting or relieving, and that he was simply going through a bad season. That was all. And while the frustration in his voice was genuine, the numbers tell a much more specific story than simply “a bad season.” Through eight starts in 2026, Bello owns a 16.88 ERA in the first inning. As a bulk reliever in May (entering after an opener, with the game already underway) he posted a 0.71 ERA and a 0.91 WHIP across 25⅓ innings. Yet his overall ERA sits at 5.63. His xERA is 5.96. This is not bad luck. The quality of contact he is allowing explains nearly all of the damage. The biggest change, and the most obvious place to start, is the cutter. The Whiff Rate by Zone maps from 2025 and 2026 tell the story with brutal clarity. In 2025, Bello dominated the inner part of the strike zone with that pitch. He generated a 21.7% whiff rate in the lower-middle portion of the zone, 15.6% in the heart of the plate and 14.3% on the inner-middle edge. Outside the zone, toward the left-handed batter’s side, the numbers climbed to 66.7% up and 65.0% down. It was a pitch with teeth everywhere. The 2026 map is an entirely different world. The top row inside the strike zone shows 0.0%, 0.0% and 0.0%. Three consecutive zones at zero. It is not that Bello is throwing fewer cutters there — it is that when he throws them, hitters simply do not miss. They know exactly what to do with them. The area that belonged to him in 2025 is now no-man’s land. And the contact generated there has been devastating: opponents are slugging .833 against the cutter with a .480 wOBA so far this season. What makes the picture even more frustrating is that the 2026 chart still shows hot zones, but they are outside the strike zone. Off the plate against left-handed hitters, the cutter is generating whiff rates of 50.0%, 100.0% and 62.5%. The pitch still dominates in those areas. Bello already has the answer within the same offering; he is simply looking for it in the wrong place. Pitch BA SLG wOBA Whiff% Uso% Sweeper .130 .130 .117 19.2% 11.4% Sinker .314 .410 .366 16.9% 43.0% Changeup .263 .368 .274 30.7% 15.5% Cutter .361 .833 .480 45.5% 16.9% Four Seamer .600 .867 .646 14.3% 6.3% The table says everything Bello does not want to hear. His most dominant pitch is the one he throws the least. The pitch allowing the most damage is his second-most-used offering. And the four-seam fastball, despite an .867 slugging percentage against it, continues to appear in 6.3% of his pitches for no obvious reason. The league adjusted. He still has not. Opponents’ Pull% against Bello jumped from 39.9% in 2025 to 51.3% in 2026. More than half of all contact is now being hit to the batter’s pull side. Pull AIR% (the rate of pulled fly balls allowed) rose from 15.7% to 23.1%. When a pitcher reaches a 51% pull rate, the signal is unmistakable: hitters know where the ball is headed before it leaves his hand. They are anticipating locations, getting the barrel out earlier and lifting the baseball with intent. That directly explains why Bello’s HR/FB% nearly doubled in a single year, rising from 10.3% to 18.5%. If all of that isn't enough to understand his demotion back to the minors, then we need to discuss the paradox that may best summarize his season. His SwStr% climbed from 8.6% in 2025 to 11.4% in 2026. More swings and misses. On paper, that should be an improvement. But when opponents make contact, they are making harder contact. His Barrel% increased from 7.1% to 9.7%. His solid-contact rate rose from 5.0% to 7.2%. His Topped% and Weak% both declined. Bello is generating less weak contact than at any point in recent seasons. His profile has become binary: either the hitter misses completely, or he drives the ball with authority. The middle ground — the soft ground ball, the harmless pop-up — has virtually disappeared. And in baseball, that middle ground is precisely what separates a solid pitcher from one living on the edge of disaster in every count. He is 27 years old, the age when pitchers are supposed to establish themselves. Instead, he is heading in the opposite direction, toward Worcester, searching for something he lost or trying to understand something he never realized was changing. View full article

There are moments in baseball when a player stops being the person you thought he was. Not because of a dramatic announcement or a sudden transformation, but because one day you look at the numbers and realize they no longer fit the story you have been telling about him for years. For Boston Red Sox outfielder Jarren Duran, that moment arrived in April 2026. Across 108 plate appearances, Duran put together the worst opening month of any season in his major-league career. His .250 slugging percentage, .222 wOBA, 32 wRC+, and 42 OPS+ were all career lows for any month in which he accumulated at least 50 plate appearances. He also posted a career-worst 35.6% whiff rate. The contact disappeared, the plate discipline eroded, and the flashes of power that had begun to emerge over the previous few years seemed to vanish with them. In other words, he lost his identity as a hitter. Duran arrived in the major leagues as a speed project — the kind of player who steals bases, runs down balls that only elite defenders can reach, and gives you a single here and a double there, enough to impact a game without ever being mistaken for a true power threat. That's a useful asset, but not the kind of player pitchers lose sleep over because of his home-run potential. And yet that story just took an unexpected turn. In 26 games during May, Duran hit nine home runs, more than he had ever hit in any month of his career. He also put together a personal-best streak of five consecutive games with an RBI, which stood as the longest-active RBI streak in Major League Baseball at the end of the month. • 9 home runs in May • Career-high 22 RBIs in a single month • Fourth in the American League this month with an .879 OPS The numbers he produced in May belong to a completely different hitter. He batted .261 with four doubles, one triple, nine walks, and 14 runs scored. Over his last 13 games, beginning on May 16, he has hit .333 with a 1.069 OPS, nine extra-base hits, and 14 RBIs. Only one left-handed hitter in all of baseball owns a higher slugging percentage than Duran's .717 during that stretch. (Yes, it's Juan Soto at .830.) Those are MVP-caliber numbers, not the production you expect from a leadoff hitter on a sub-.500 team. What the Advanced Metrics Say About Jarren Duran's Hot Streak To understand whether this power is real or simply a mirage, you have to go to Baseball Savant. And that's where the conversation becomes more complicated... in the most interesting way possible. Duran's Barrel% sits at 12.1% in 2026, the highest mark of his career. His Barrel/PA rate has also climbed to 7.6, above the 6.3 he posted in 2025 and well above the MLB average of 4.9. In terms of quality contact, he has entered elite territory. His average exit velocity of 90.7 mph has remained relatively stable compared to previous seasons, which suggests he is not necessarily hitting the ball harder, but rather making more of the hard contact he does generate. Season Barrel% Barrel/PA EV HardHit% xwOBA 2023 5.3 3.6 90 46.3 .322 2024 9.3 6.5 91 43.9 .340 2025 9.7 6.3 92 46.8 .326 2026 12.1 7.6 91 41.1 .313 MLB avg. 7.6 4.9 89 37 .316 But there is tension within those numbers. Duran's .313 xwOBA in 2026 is lower than the .326 he posted in 2025 and nearly identical to the league average. His HardHit% has dropped from 46.8% to 41.1%. Paradoxically, he is producing more barrels while generating less hard contact overall. That only happens one way: he has become more selective about the pitches he chooses to destroy. That theory gains even more weight when we see that Duran's average bat speed has reached a career-high 75.2 mph. More importantly, this is not simply a matter of swinging harder. He is also posting the lowest swing rate of his career at 47%. This is about timing — about unleashing his best swing only when he finds a pitch he can do real damage with. The Launch-Angle Adjustment Duran's batted-ball profile in 2026 tells another fascinating story. His Pull AIR% has jumped to 17.2%, the highest mark of his career and well above the 15.2% he posted in 2025, not to mention his career average of 12.2%. At the same time, his ground-ball rate has fallen to 44.4%, also a career best. That is the signature of a hitter who has adjusted his mechanics to elevate the baseball when the situation calls for it. Pitch-tracking data confirms the trend. Against fastballs in May, Duran produced a staggering .797 slugging percentage, along with eight home runs and a .339 batting average. The difference is the launch angle. Month Pitch Type BA SLG wOBA EV Whiff% May/26 Fastball .339 .797 .508 93 31.2 Apr/26 Fastball .171 .345 .250 90 25.6 May/26 Breaking .205 .341 .257 88 35.1 May/26 Off-speed .083 .083 .116 86 34.6 The most revealing comparison is April versus May against fastballs. In April, Duran hit just .171 with a .345 slugging percentage against heaters. In May, those numbers exploded to .339 and .797. At this point, it is fair to wonder how the rest of the league kept feeding him fastballs while he spent an entire month turning them into souvenirs. The Batting-Average Problem — and Why It Shouldn't Matter So Much The obvious criticism is his .219 batting average for the season. For an everyday player, that number is low, but it hides two very different stories. In May, Duran hit .259 and saw his wRC+ climb from 32 to 137. Over his last 13 games of the month, he hit .333 with a 196 wRC+. His season average is still carrying the weight of an April in which he struggled to elevate the baseball and watched too many balls die harmlessly in gloves. What makes it difficult to dismiss all of this as simply a hot month is the consistency of the underlying profile. The rising Barrel% is not a fluke. It climbed to 9.3% in 2024, rose again to 9.7% in 2025, and now sits at 12.1% in 2026. The quality of contact has improved year after year. The home-run surge in May did not come out of nowhere—it was simply the latest stage of a trend that had been developing for quite some time. The danger with Duran was always the same: that in his pursuit of power, he would lose the traits that made him special. Luckily, that never happened. He still leads the club with 10 stolen bases, and his five outfield assists from left field are the most by any player at the position in Major League Baseball. Those five assists are yet another reminder that runners continue to underestimate both the strength of his arm and the defensive instincts that make him such a valuable player even when the bat goes quiet. He is not the same player who posted a +11 Run Value in 2024, but his current +3 remains more than respectable. The complete five-tool profile — speed, emerging power, arm strength, defense, and contact ability — usually appears once in a blue moon. Duran is not there yet. But for 26 games in May 2026, he flashed exactly that kind of ceiling. The Big Question: Is Any of This Sustainable? The honest answer is probably not at May's level. An .847 OPS over a month, paired with eight home runs from a player hitting .219 for the season, carries all the hallmarks of a peak. His .313 xwOBA suggests the underlying models do not fully believe he deserved every bit of that production. Pitchers will adjust — if they have not already — and the number of off-speed pitches he sees is almost certain to increase. What does appear sustainable, however, is the direction. A 12.1% Barrel rate is not suddenly going to collapse back to 5%. The elevated Pull AIR% does not look like a one-month anomaly, nor does the increase in average bat speed. The mechanical adjustment (lifting the baseball when he pulls it) is real, and the data reflects it. Put another way: Duran probably is not going to hit eight home runs in June. But he is not going back to being the flat-contact hitter he was in 2022 and 2023, either. For a team that has struggled to find power while spending the first two months of the season drifting nine or ten games behind the division leaders, that evolution could be exactly what the Red Sox need. View full article

Thanks for reading and commenting, Tedballgame. It’s absolutely frustrating what we’re seeing from the Red Sox. And the worst part is that even the talent they do have can’t seem to come together into a different kind of baseball. There’s no real formula here that makes it feel like they can consistently score runs, even against weaker rotations or bad bullpens. I still wonder how they let Alex Bregman go without bringing in Eugenio Suárez or making another key move at third base. Wilyer Abreu, who has been one of their most consistent hitters, is now putting far more balls on the ground instead of driving them in the air the way he did before. He has exactly half of the 12 home runs he had through the first 50 games last season. And Willson Contreras isn’t really the kind of slugger you automatically fear changing a game with one swing. Like you said, opposing pitchers don’t feel enough pressure from this lineup. There isn’t enough protection or enough dangerous bats to create sustained offensive threats.

For much of the last two decades, the Boston Red Sox built offenses that punished the smallest mistake. A poorly located fastball at Fenway Park could change a game in seconds. A routine fly ball could turn into a double off the Monster. A seemingly quiet inning could suddenly explode. These 2026 Red Sox are the exact opposite. Through their first 51 games, Boston owns a 22-29 record and ranks near the bottom of MLB in nearly every important offensive category: 29th in runs per game (3.71), 29th in home runs (36), 29th in slugging percentage (.362), and 27th in OPS (.676). The strange part is not simply the statistical decline. The strange part is the type of offense Boston has become: a lineup that still collects hits, but almost never creates real damage. One of the team’s new additions, first baseman Willson Contreras, leads the lineup with 10 of the club’s 36 home runs. That represents 28% of the team’s total power production, the second-highest share in MLB behind Kyle Schwarber, who has hit 20 home runs—32% of the Philadelphia Phillies’ 62 total homers. Boston’s pitching staff has shined in many areas early this season, but the lack of offensive impact and game-changing swings has become one of the defining problems of this Red Sox club. Let’s dig deeper into some of the most pressing issues facing this lineup through the first 50 games of the season. The Worst Lineup in MLB Against Fastballs Modern baseball revolves around a simple truth: elite offenses destroy four-seam fastballs. Boston does not. The Red Sox own MLB’s worst ISO against four-seamers (.118), and that number probably summarizes their entire offensive crisis better than any other metric. Red Sox vs. Four-Seam Fastballs Metric Boston MLB Context AVG .252 Acceptable OBP .357 Good SLG .371 Very poor ISO .118 Worst in MLB HR 8 Extremely low Whiff% 21.10% Near league average Average EV 89.3 mph Barely average Barrel% 8.30% Mediocre Launch Angle 16.8° Too little loft xSLG 0.377 Nearly identical to actual SLG There lies the central contradiction of this offense: Boston is not getting overwhelmed by velocity. They are not striking out excessively. They are not constantly swinging through pitches. They just simply do not do damage. While the New York Yankees, Atlanta Braves, Los Angeles Dodgers, and San Diego Padres turn fastballs into massive slugging production, Boston converts too many heaters into relatively harmless singles. And the most concerning part is that there are not many signs of bad luck. After the departures of Rafael Devers and Alex Bregman, combined with the injuries and inconsistency of Trevor Story, Boston’s power production has collapsed. Even after leaving midway through 2025, no Red Sox hitter has surpassed the .401 OBP, .504 slugging percentage, and .905 OPS that Devers posted over his first 73 games last season. One of Boston’s new acquisitions, Caleb Durbin, is hitting .166/.244/.241/.485 with one home run and 16 RBIs through his first 162 plate appearances. His swing was never expected to generate much power. Durbin’s xSLG sits at .286, well below the current league average (.400). Jarren Duran posted a .727 OPS through his first 50 games last season. This year, he has fallen to .612 through 46 games. Wilyer Abreu has pulled the ball 7.6% less frequently compared to last season. He is striking out less and making more contact against fastballs, but his power output has diminished significantly. The expected slugging numbers for Red Sox hitters almost perfectly mirror their actual slugging percentages. That means the issue is not hard-hit balls finding gloves. The problem runs much deeper: the quality of damage simply does not exist. Boston is producing exactly the kind of contact modern pitchers want to induce: shallow fly balls, line drives without elite authority, manageable air contact, and very few truly destructive swings. Fenway Park No Longer Amplifies Power The strangest transformation of these Red Sox may be showing up in their fly balls. For years, Fenway Park functioned like an extra-base machine. Boston built lineups specifically designed to exploit that environment: pull-heavy swings, loft, and airborne power. In 2026, those fly balls no longer scare anyone. Boston’s Evolution in Air Damage Season SLG en Fly Balls OPS en Fly Balls 2019 .852 1.123 2020 .620 .836 2021 .739 .973 2022 .675 .909 2023 .690 .931 2024 .754 1.003 2025 .679 .903 2026 .546 .756 Boston is still lifting the baseball. The problem is that those fly balls are no longer turning into home runs. And that reveals one of the most fascinating offensive oddities in baseball: the Red Sox still hit reasonably well on fly balls, but they generate dramatically less damage than teams with similar—or even worse—profiles. Boston is generating the worst kind of fly ball in modern baseball: survivable fly balls. Balls hit just hard enough to fall for hits. But not violently enough to change games. That ties directly into the four-seam fastball problem. Modern four-seamers are specifically designed to induce this type of contact: shallow fly balls, routine center-field outs, and “playable” air contact. The Red Sox are falling completely into the trap. The Lineup Lost Its Slugging Transformers Once you examine the individual decline within the lineup, the problem begins to look even more structural. Through the first 50 games of 2025, Alex Bregman, Rafael Devers, and Wilyer Abreu accounted for much of the team’s airborne damage. Together, the trio had combined for 33 home runs. This season, Abreu has just six, while Devers and Bregman are no longer part of the offense. That completely changed the geometry of the lineup. Bregman was almost a perfect Fenway prototype: compact swing, natural loft, and the ability to punish fastballs toward the Monster. Devers brought pure violence against velocity. Abreu complemented the group with legitimate left-handed power. Outside of Contreras’ power production, Boston now looks filled with functional hitters—but very few finishers. Jarren Duran has only six home runs in 202 plate appearances. Ceddanne Rafaela has four in 182 plate appearances. Trevor Story owns a .303 slugging percentage. Roman Anthony has only one homer in 130 plate appearances. Masataka Yoshida has yet to homer in 106 plate appearances. This is a lineup with contact, speed, and some doubles. But very little collective intimidation. And that forces Boston to manufacture runs the hardest way possible: plate discipline and long strings of consecutive hits. In modern baseball, that is an extremely fragile formula. Elite offenses survive because one swing changes entire innings. These Red Sox need long sequences of singles and situational contact to produce what other teams generate with one well-struck fly ball. The Most Concerning Stat: They Don’t Even Punish Mistakes The best offenses destroy middle-middle pitches. Boston no longer does. Red Sox vs. Middle-Middle Pitches Temporada SLG xSLG HR Hard Hit% Barrel% 2022 .645 .671 43 53.8 18.7 2023 .574 .590 33 49.2 14.9 2024 .671 .673 40 55.1 19.8 2025 .616 .641 51 51.4 17.6 2026 .462 .550 5 41.7 6.9 That may be the most alarming signal in the entire offense. Boston still makes contact: a .308 batting average, just a 7.2% whiff rate, and only 14 strikeouts in 213 plate appearances. But the damage vanished. The barrel rate has fallen from nearly 20% in 2024 to just 6.9%. The hard-hit rate dropped more than 13 points. And the five home runs against middle-middle pitches are an absurdly low total—the worst in baseball—for a franchise historically built around punishing mistakes. MLB Comparison: Contact vs. Damage (Bottom 10 teams in slugging vs. middle-middle pitches) Equipo AVG SLG HR Hard Hit% Barrel% BOS .308 .462 5 41.7 6.9 SD .308 .626 12 55.8 18.3 MIN .319 .569 9 51.6 14.1 BAL .320 .558 10 53.1 15.9 SF .321 .591 8 54.7 16.4 Among the league’s weakest slugging teams against middle-middle pitches, Boston produces contact. The other teams produce destruction. And that completely changes how pitchers can attack them. When a lineup stops punishing fastballs and middle-middle mistakes, pitchers no longer feel pressure to escape toward sliders or changeups. They can live aggressively in the strike zone. They can attack up in the zone. They can throw early-count fastballs without fear of serious consequences. And perhaps that leads to the most uncomfortable question for Boston: is this just a slump—or a new offensive identity? Because many offensive crises usually hide signs of recovery. A high xSLG. Plenty of hard contact without results. A lineup full of hitters underperforming their expected numbers. But these Red Sox do not show many signs of an imminent rebound. Their expected metrics almost always validate the real results. The problem does not appear circumstantial. As many suspected, it looks structural. Boston still has useful players. It has speed. It has discipline. It has contact. It even has a pitching staff capable of keeping them competitive most nights. But it lost something that defined the great offenses of Fenway Park for years: the ability to create fear. And in today’s MLB, that changes everything. When opponents no longer fear the fastball in the zone, the entire game tilts toward the pitcher. Counts change. Aggression changes. The way teams attack the lineup changes. The Red Sox no longer dictate at-bats. Now they react to them. Maybe Boston finds adjustments. Perhaps Roman Anthony eventually develops the power that still appears latent. Maybe Trevor Story recaptures some of his impact. Maybe more airborne damage arrives during the summer. But through 50 plus games, the evidence points toward an uncomfortable reality: The Red Sox no longer hit like a dangerous offense. View full article