Jayhawk Bill

Let's check Manny's Zone Rating...we'll use RZR: 2004 .578 2005 .527 2006 .643 2007 .684 On the bright side, like a fine wine, Manny's defense seems to improve with age. On the down side, like Boone's Farm, aside from its being worth a few giggles among friends it's really pretty bad if you evaluate it objectively. Per THT, 16 MLB players qualified for consideration as full-time left fielders in 2007. Fifteen of those players had RZRs ranging from .923 (Eric Byrnes) to .803 (Pat Burrell). Manny's .684 RZR was further below the next-to-worst fielder's RZR than that player's RZR was below the leader's. Manny has been worst in MLB for three consecutive years; only Adam Dunn and Miggy Cabrera have come close to Manny's ineptitude in that time. Pat Burrell and, especially, Barry Bonds are comfortably better than Manny in the outfield. Do I want Manny at his option price in 2009? Only as a DH. Because that would mean that Big Papi had been traded or that he'd suffered a terrible setback as a player, I'm hoping that there won't be a role for Manny in 2009 on the Red Sox, unless he's willing to come back to Boston for far less than his option price and play as a starter in Fenway and a fourth OF/PH on the road.

Thanks for the link! Not that it's that important, but Elias uses a combined ranking scale indexed to make the best player 100.000. That player is David Ortiz. *** Wow. Part of the calculus in acquiring Eric Gagne was that Boston would get Type A compensation: http://www.sethmnookin.com/blog/2007/08/02/darkman-and-gagne-and-paps-oh-my/ From the link above, there were 25 Type A relief pitchers. Here are the last ten: 16 Joaquin Benoit 75.893 A 17 Fernando Rodney 75.716 A 18 Alan Embree 75.362 A 19 Scott Downs 74.196 A 20 George Sherrill 73.842 A 21 Justin Speier 72.923 A 22 Joakim Soria 72.853 A 23 Jeremy Accardo 72.782 A 24 Jamie Walker 72.393 A 25 Matt Guerrier 72.040 A Gagne was a top-notch closer for four months of the season. To miss qualifying with those guys, he really, really had to mess up--which we know he did. He ended up 40th, behind, among others, Mike Timlin. Just as an aside, yes, I know that these are multi-year rankings. BJ Ryan managed to finish tenth despite that.

First, too kind. Thank you. Second, let's look at Fisk and Stargell. If you look at Fisk's best seasons by WARP1, his 37-home run 1985 would rank sixth: overall, it was nowhere near his best. That was 1977; his second best year was 1972. The peak appears to be in 1976-78 by WARP1, at ages 28-30. That's a little late, but not unusual for a catcher. Looking deeper at Fisk's 1985, his BABIP was just .213 for the season. That's astoundingly low: here are the averages for various types of balls in play (Source: Fangraphs) Line Drive .716 Ground Ball .236 Fly Ball .167 The average MLB BABIP is around .300. Most MLB players hit about 16-18% line drives, and that gets you an overall BABIP of around .120 from those few at bats alone. Let's look at it a different way: if Fisk got home runs on 12% of his fly balls (about MLB average) then he hit fly balls in 308 of 462 times he put balls into play or out of the park, suggesting that 271 of his 425 balls in play might've been fly balls. Getting a .167 BABIP on the 64% of your balls in play that were fly balls would go a long way to explaining your miserable BABIP of .213. Maybe Carlton Fisk just gave up on line drives and started trying to hit home runs. Regarding Willie Stargell, by WARP1 the 1979 MVP season was his twelfth-best. It does look as if he, too, hit his peak from ages 31 to 33, but his home ballpark became an extraordinary pitcher's park for a brief moment in 1969 and 1970. Check the Pirates' home and away splits for home runs those years: Home Away 1969 41 78 1970 43 87 Combine the Second Deadball Era with the Three Rivers' Stadium Deadball Era, take those away, and suddenly Willie Stargell is 31 before he got a chance to show his stuff. As an aside, Stargell was the sixth-best player on his own team by WARP1 in 1979: OMAR MORENO 8.0 DAVE PARKER 8.0 PHIL GARNER 7.7 KENT TEKULVE 7.1 TIM FOLI 5.5 WILLIE STARGELL 5.2 They talk about Jeter's "intangibles:" Derek Jeter didn't hold a candle to Stargell on the "intangibles" front. *** Yes, I'm suspicious of many players who peak in their 30's regarding steroid use, position players and pitchers alike. The rapid declines of several of those players only aggravate suspicions.

Keeping it brief because it's a tangent, here's the deal: 1) Against RHP he's a Red Sox-caliber and Red Sox-type hitter. Against LHP he's mediocre: overall he's MLB-caliber as a hitter, but he's better suited to a platoon role. 2) Carter is bad defensively at first base. 3) Arizona had Conor Jackson at first base, backed up by Tony Clark. I hear that they're pretty good. Tucson is a PCL team, so offense can be inflated, but the recent PF isn't extraordinary. From Minor League Splits: Tucson Sidewinders H 1.09 2B 1.03 HR 0.81 BB 0.97 K 0.84 Tucson has had Park Factors as high as the 1.10 area in the past.

True, but in an environment of 3% annual inflation and 2-4 year contracts, it doesn't make much difference. MLB has enjoyed a period of excellent revenue growth, with revenues this year more than 10% over 2006's (Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Oct 19, 2007), but gambling that MLB revenue growth will continue to outpace inflation may be risky. PECOTA bases its projections for each player on 20 closest "comparable players." Here are A-Rod's "comparable players" for 2007, along with the appropriate year and similarity score* Ken Boyer??? Well, check the similarity scores: they're not too high, because there are few A-Rods. Furthermore, PECOTA looks back three years, not over complete careers, and several of the players listed were power-speed guys with strong peaks around age 30 who tailed off rapidly thereafter. But there are some HOF-caliber players there, too, and they tailed off pretty fast. Eddie Mathews does seem to be a good comparable: he lost 50 OBP points permanently at age 32, and he retired right after his age 36 season. Jeff Bagwell had a similar double peak as a batter to A-Rod's, and he was gone before age 38. Dave Winfield played very well through age 40 and played until age 43, except for injury time, but he stands out from this group. I'd have to agree that PECOTA may be pessimistic, but I wanted to point out the collapse of some of his comparable players. Let's take another approach: let's look at Baseball Reference comparable players by age. BR looks at entire careers and biases results more strongly by position. Who do they pick? Johnny Bench pops up because catcher is considered defensively demanding by BR, so much so that few players cross over between catcher and the next-toughest position, shortstop. He's not a good comparable. Neither, IMO, is Jimmie Foxx (C/1B ) or Mickey Mantle (CH3CH2OH). Vlad Guerrero is still active and still at A-Rod's age, disqualifying him. The other six could be considered comparable. Only three of those six, Hank Aaron, Frank Robinson and Rogers Hornsby, stayed active for nine or more years. Hornsby won an MVP at age 33, but his performance collapsed precipitously after that season--he should've retired, just as Mathews and Ott did. Ken Griffey Jr. was plagued by injuries through his thirties. Frank Robinson contended for two MVP Awards, earned four All Star spots, and played six more HOF-caliber seasons. Hank Aaron, of course, moved from Hall of Famer to legend in those years of his career. He contended for three MVP Awards; he went to ten straight All Star Games. I'll buy into your hesitance to accept PECOTA, but I look at BR comparables and I see one chance in six of increasing injuries (Griffey), one chance in six of another great half-decade and an adequate five other years (Robinson), three chances in six of a five-to-seven-year decline leaving A-Rod below replacement level (Hornsby, Mathews, Ott), and only one chance in six of his doing what many of us are thinking that he'll do: challenge the records of Ruth, Aaron and Bonds. And just one more thing: if there were a category for comparable players by personality, A-Rod would not be a close comparable to Henry Aaron. We concur. :thumbsup: ***************************************************************** I think that you raise a good point. But here I disagree with you. Kevin Youkilis plays a good third base, and Chris Carter is an MLB-caliber hitter. If the money saved on A-Rod goes to land Johan Santana (or comparable talent) instead, the Red Sox will still be an improved team next year.

Why did I suddenly have a premonition of a late May 2008 press conference with both Pettitte and Clemens announcing their decisions to play for the Houston Astros for the remainder of the season?

Hold on, just a minute now... The price for A-Rod is, last I checked, highest bidder or first team to offer 10/330. Whether or not that's worthwhile depends upon a few things: 1) What is the discount rate for the out years of the contract? Normally when I play around with contract values I leave that stuff out, because contracts are usually 2-4 years long, not 8-10 years long. Superstar contracts are different, and there are several factors pointing to a possible return to significant inflation rates. Here's a quick run of the net present value of a 10-year, $33 million per annum contract, all payments on January 1 (for simplicity), at five different discount rates: $278MM 4.0% $239MM 8.0% $209MM 12.0% $185MM 16.0% $166MM 20.0% Remember that post I made where it looked as if A-Rod were worth about $211 million over the next ten years? If you believe that there'll be 12% annual inflation in the MLB world, then it makes sense to sign a 10/330 contract for A-Rod, because $209 million (the value of cash outflow) is less than $211 million (the estimated value of A-Rod's productivity). What's going on with the price of oil? Will the subprime lending crisis devalue the dollar? Will face-value ticket prices in Fenway rise to match the prices that scalpers are getting? If the answers to these questions suggest an inflation rate of 12% or more around Fenway Park, sign A-Rod. 2) Do you want to Go For It Now? If Boston signs A-Rod and essentially does nothing else, here's your 2008 Boston Red Sox: 2B Pedroia 1B Youkilis DH Ortiz 3B Rodriguez LF Ramirez RF Drew C Varitek SS Lugo CF Ellsbury LF/CF Crisp OF Kielty C Mirabelli or Cash or Kottaras SS/2B Cora SP Beckett SP Matsuzaka SP Buchholz SP Schilling SP Lester SP Wakefield CL Papelbon SU Okajima RP Delcarmen RP (Choose three more from 40-man, except for Gagne) The odds of winning a World Series are, on average, 3.33% for each team each season. This move uses what could be the last season for Schilling or Wakefield, the last Red Sox season for Manny, the last contract season for Tek, and plugs the absolute best player in MLB smack into the middle of the lineup. That gives us a chance significantly better than 3.33% to win another World Series--maybe, without exaggeration, as high as 20-30% for one perfect year. The hangover could last for years, but there may never again in our lifetimes be the chance to make such a move as this, the syzygy of a World Championship, an MVP HOF-caliber free agent, and a perfect opportunity to put that man into the team. Three World Series wins in five years would make this generation of Boston Red Sox more than a mini-dynasty: it would start putting them into a league with the early 70's A's, and the deadball era Red Sox and A's, behind only the best Yankees squads for greatest team ever. Four World Series wins in, say, eight years in a 30-team structure and a three-tiered playoff format would be achieveable, and that would put Boston on a par with the Yankees' best showing. The payback period might be the last half-decade of A-Rod's contract, but what a ride it could be. 3) Who is the real Alex Rodriguez? Discounting his early cups of coffee, here's A-Rod's career: Age Year BA OBA SLG 20 1996 0.358 0.414 0.631 21 1997 0.300 0.350 0.496 22 1998 0.310 0.360 0.560 23 1999 0.285 0.357 0.586 24 2000 0.316 0.420 0.606 25 2001 0.318 0.399 0.622 26 2002 0.300 0.392 0.623 27 2003 0.298 0.396 0.600 28 2004 0.286 0.375 0.512 29 2005 0.321 0.421 0.610 30 2006 0.290 0.392 0.523 31 2007 0.314 0.422 0.645 Let's focus on that last column, SLG. A-Rod came up full-time at age 20. He was practically unstoppable--pitchers didn't yet know his weaknesses. By his sophomore year, they'd found something, and his SLG dropped to .496. From there through age 27 we've got a typical HOF player career curve, peaking at .622 and .623 at ages 25 and 26. (Hall of Famers often peak young, because they start in MLB so young that they're no longer developing skills at age 27, while average players are still learning a bit in their late 20's to offset the early decline of their talent.) Then what? Look, I believe that A-Rod's age 29 season, 2005, fits just fine. On either side of it, though, we have what looks like either injury or inadequate attention to his game. Worst, his contract year was the best season of his career: I don't know whether to call it a fluke, the result of a slacker finally paying attention, or selective subtle use of PEDs. I do know that most HOF-caliber players who peaked in their 30's were later alleged to have been juicing; I also know that a fairly rigorous testing program is now in place in MLB. The recent wide fluctuations in A-Rod's performance trouble me. *** Would I take A-Rod at 10/300 or so? I don't know. I wouldn't criticize the move were Boston to sign him, but I'd sure want to see how things worked out over a period of years before applauding the move too loudly.

An interesting couple of paragraphs from Jim Baker's piece this afternoon at BP: I can't say that Jim Baker agrees with me, but I can write with certainty that both of us believe that Boras knows something regarding A-Rod's employment opportunities that isn't yet public knowledge.

Absolutely correct--but there's nothing about a previous player getting ownership. *** Something I just realized: Wrigley Field is a good home run park, but the advantage is strictly in the left-center field power alley (Source: Home Run Park Factor—A New Approach by Greg Rybarczyk June 18, 2007, The Hardball Times). Wrigley's rating up that alley is 122, the highest in MLB--higher than Coors Field or Camden Yards, the runners-up. If you check A-Rod's hit chart at MLB.com, you'll see that most of his extra-base hits are right down that alley--as are more than a handful of his fly outs. If A-Rod wants the home run record, Wrigley is the place for him to go.

No trouble with Schilling being the whateverth starter at $13 million for one--exactly one--year. That's not much of a premium over his likely talent level, and you know that he can get a better premium elsewhere in this free agent market. *** Regarding Wakefield, he did pitch 189 innings and win 17 games this year. He's pitched 140 innings or more for 13 consecutive seasons--and that counts one season where he earned 15 saves as a closer. Given the talent of the other five pitchers we're discussing, I don't fault the suggestion that he fill Julian Tavarez's role. I just think that it's a little early to label him an "injury risk." How many other active pitchers have thrown 140 or more IP for as many consecutive seasons? Jamie Moyer has twelve...I believe that only Mussina, Glavine and Maddux equal or surpass Tim Wakefield in that regard. That's pretty good company; I'm not disappointed with Tim Wakefield regarding his frequency of injury.

I fully understand and concur. Does that make a difference? Traditionally free agents have signed around December or January, but there's a case to be made that a true superstar might do better waiting longer. Marginal small-market teams learned long ago that they get the greatest return for their talent in trades around July 30th each year. Once teams get into the season, their weaknesses become much more evident--that's when talent fetches its highest price. In recent seasons one of the best starting pitchers in baseball decided to wait until the middle of springtime to sign a contract each year. Roger Clemens got astoundingly large salaries, culminating in this year's $28,000,022 contract, prorated to roughly $17.4 million for the time that he played. (Source: Cot's Contracts) To get that much, almost a million dollars per game, for 99 innings of 4.18 ERA is amazing...for Roger Clemens, waiting his time to sign a contract worked very well. If Alex Rodriguez joins a team in May instead of April, but he signs a ten-year $300+ million contract, the loss of playing time will be a trivial cost in the greater scheme of the successful negotiation. That's why I consider the Cubs one viable option. My somewhat unique interpretation of the story behind that rumor regarding talks between either Canning or Cuban and Boras is why I think that the Cubs might have the best shot.

While I'm far from certain, I'm speculating that A-Rod might be headed to the Cubs. Remember this discredited rumor? (While I can't yet link to sources, check ESPN MLB news, story?id=3033203) Here's what struck me: 1) Scott Boras was in no way restricted by MLB Rules from talking to either Cuban or Canning, likely purchasers of the Cubs from the Tribune. He couldn't yet talk to any team--but prospective owners aren't teams. 2) When Levine got word, he ran to Selig. MLB does have the right to approve or disapprove team sales for any reason they choose. After Selig supported Levine, Boras quickly pooh-poohed the idea that he'd talked to a prospective owner. He did not say that his agency hadn't talked to anybody--he just said that he hadn't spoken personally, and the media was satisfied. 3) A player can sign a contract involving deferred compensation, and that compensation could later be used, after retirement, to buy part of a team. It just can't be in the formal agreement during the player's career. *** I'm thinking that A-Rod will avoid signing until the deal is done for the Cubs, and that he'll then go to the highest bidder. I further speculate that advance knowledge of a likely Cubs offer is what prompted Boras to turn down a very large offer from the Yankees.

Too kind; thank you. The obvious alternative to Mike Lowell involves moving Youkilis to third, bringing up Chris Carter and finding a platoon partner for Carter who can hit lefties and can field the position well. Carter can already hit RHP at what appears to be an MLB level: Pawtucket 2007: .300/.364/.500 Tucson 2007: .339/.388/.555 Tucson 2006: .300/.399/.525 Source: Minor League Splits (I can't post links yet. ) Pawtucket was a small sample size, but the two years at Tucson aren't and the stats vs. RHP are similar at both sites. Carter can hit RHP; the trouble is that he's a little substandard vs. LHP and a lot substandard with his glove. Guys who can play first base pretty well and who can hit LHP are available. Some of them are trapped AAA prospects whose stats vs. RHP are holding them back from MLB; some are veterans. Some might put Kevin Millar into such a category, just to choose one name in whom the Red Sox were recently rumored to have interest. I suspect that there are better candidates, although there might be few more popular at Fenway. But answering your query, I see the alternative to Mike Lowell as being Chris Carter and a platoon partner. That would save Boston a very considerable amount of payroll, money that could be used either for pitching, for potential high-priced mid-season acquisitions, or for future seasons' free agents. Again, thanks. Remember, though, BP published the formula: I'm merely applying it to an adjusted PECOTA forecast. A-Rod...that's tough. But making these assumptions: 1) We use the same shift to the PECOTA forecast that we did in the third instance for Mike Lowell, the difference between the forecast 2007 projection and the actual 2007 value; and 2) After four years we assume a 10% reduction in WARP each successive year; then we go from this, the preseason PECOTA forecast for A-Rod's value: 2008 $24,500,000 2009 $19,625,000 2010 $15,475,000 2011 $11,350,000 To this: 2008 $41,793,320 $41,793,320 2009 $34,413,426 $76,206,746 2010 $28,557,472 $104,764,217 2011 $23,082,243 $127,846,460 2012 $19,763,515 $147,609,975 2013 $16,929,935 $164,539,911 2014 $14,510,582 $179,050,493 2015 $12,444,903 $191,495,396 2016 $10,681,195 $202,176,590 2017 $9,175,314 $211,351,904 The second money column is the cumulative contract value. Everything I wrote regarding forecasts for Lowell applies again. Here's another important caveat, though: the bulk of the regression analysis upon which these salary forecasts were based involved shorter contracts. My subjective belief is that GMs chronically underestimate the potential for decline among HOF-caliber players whom they sign to long-term deals. Subjectively, I believe that the 5/148 line in the above table might reflect fair value--but A-Rod wants, and Boras believes that he can get, an 8-10 year deal. I'd expect those later years to be valued at around $28-30 million each, not the (more realistic) values posted above. I'd pay Mike Lowell $50 million for three years before I'd touch A-Rod at what I expect the final price to be.

I like Mike. Really. I do. I'm just not sure how much I like him, or for how long I'll like him. And what really worries me is how much it might take to sign him. There's been a fair amount of recent attention in cyberspace to Baseball Prospectus's salary value forecast for Mike Lowel published in their PECOTA projections this spring. Here it is: 2008 $9,325,000 2009 $8,000,000 2010 $5,750,000 2011 $5,325,000 Nothing too scary there. The thing is, when this was published Lowell was only one season removed from his horrible 2005 season, where he batted .236/.298/.360 with 58 RBI in 150 games, the season that led to his becoming the "throw-in" in the Josh Beckett trade. That nightmare is now two years past, and his most recent season featured his all-time best OBP, 120 RBI, and a World Series MVP. While those are listed in order of decreasing importance, they may be in order of increasing importance with regards to his salary. How should we adjust our forecast? PECOTA salary projections (MORP) are based upon a player's Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP), along with regression analysis of the most recent free agent market. Setting aside momentarily that the last free agent market may understate the value of third basemen in this market, how would the difference in recent performance--in WARP--translate into salary? A lowest-case estimate would just take the difference between 2007 WARP and 2006 WARP, leaving the rest of the forecast intact. That would increase the salary projection like this: 2008 $11,080,004 2009 $9,269,076 2010 $7,573,697 2011 $6,002,355 That's roughly a 2/20 or a 3/28 forecast...still nothing too scary. But still an obvious underestimate. What if we simply shift the forecast by the difference between the 2007 PECOTA WARP and the actual 2007 WARP? PECOTA projected Mike Lowell to be at 4.4 WARP in 2007, declining from there. He was actually at 7.0 WARP--he got better, not worse, from 2006 to 2007. Suppose we keep the linear rate of decline constant, but from this higher data point? Now the numbers get scary: 2008 $18,905,451 2009 $16,710,276 2010 $14,609,389 2011 $12,607,229 Now contracts like 3/50 start to look reasonable. Is this really reasonable? Well, PECOTA regresses to the mean, and those regressed numbers are used for computing salary projections. Hitters' stats are regressed less than pitchers' stats, but just shifting the curve up would overstate for that reason. It would understate for three other reasons, though: 1) That 2005 season has retreated far enough into history to be considered an outlier data point. The 2008 PECOTA--and the current modeling by MLB teams regarding Lowell--will be adjusted accordingly. 2) The third base market will be tight in 2007-2008: if you don't get A-Rod or Lowell, you're stranded. Lowell is, amazingly, the bargain option...the Mercedes, not the Lamborghini. 3) Somehow, RBIs and MVP Awards always DO seem to count when it comes to salaries. *** Do I want Mike Lowell back? Absolutely. Do I want him back if it takes $51 million over three years to seal the deal? Sadly, no.

Hi there! I'm Jayhawk Bill, a long-time Red Sox fan whom a few of you may remember from other sites. I wanted to wait until after the excitement of the World Series victory before joining a new online group. Your autoregistration was kind enough to accept me--thanks for letting me join your community! My approach to posting is heavily stats-oriented as a rule. Please understand that my belief in metrics doesn't mean that I don't watch the games. I cheer for our victories, gnash my teeth at mistakes, pound my head into the wall over blown saves, and get a tear in my eye when anybody mentions Tony C. But if something can reasonably be quantified, I often attempt to do that, borrowing heavily from Baseball Prospectus, The Hardball Times, Baseball Reference, and several other sources, right down to pitch-by-pitch records from MLB.com Gameday. I don't do that to be difficult (at least I hope not); I do that because often the conventional wisdom appears to be wrong, or, at the least, eligible for reconsideration. Again, thank you for allowing me to join your site. I look forward to our Hot Stove discussions.