sk7326

If they were his calls maybe but only ownership knows that. If you had the Porcello trade in front of you, it's a fairly easy one to make. Interesting but exceedingly fungible expiring OF for another expiring. Whether the season is a talent, injury or coaching deficiency will be worth diagnosing also. (if i were guessing i'd go with door #3 there)

What is funny is if he were a UFA with his profile entering 2015 he probably would have gotten six years from somebody and triple figures.

Both wanted to be in charge. Lucchino is a loudmouth. Theo is too young to be happy as a 2nd in command forever.

Porcello did not have to dramatically improve to justify his salary - he just had to improve on a level a normal person would expect. He has been below replacement level, which no reasonable person could have anticipated. Lots of flaws in the quick methodology of course - the assertion that the last 200 innings are what matters for the before picture ... and the after assumes uniform performance which is shaky too. It also assumes 1000 as a number matters, which is even shakier since the number was chosen because it looks cool.

Much of the jibber jabber about 1000 innings is also making the wrong point ... The better observation might be, where were they when they crossed the 1000 inning rubicon. I used the last full season when that happened. And then where did things go from there. Pedro's last 241 IP 8.6 fWAR ... the NEXT 1000 ... 40.1 WAR in 978 IP (.036 fWAR/IP to .041 WAR/IP) Randy ... 255.1 IP 7.3 WAR ... NEXT 1000 ... 40.6 WAR in 1185 IP (.029 to .034) Brown ... 233 IP 4.4 WAR ... NEXT 1000 ... 30.8 WAR in 1069 IP (.019 to .029) Glavine ... 225 IP 4.9 WAR ... NEXT 1000 ... 21.2 WAR in 1077 IP (.022 to .020) Maddux ... 263 IP 5.9 WAR ... NEXT 1000 ... 38.8 WAR in 1191 IP (.022 to .033) Drabek ... 231 IP 4.3 WAR ... NEXT 1000 ... 18.4 WAR in 1076 IP (.019 to .017) Clemens ... 264 IP 9.2 WAR ... NEXT 1000 ... 28.5 WAR in 1001 IP (.035 to .028) Jim Palmer ... 282 IP 4.6 WAR ... NEXT 1000 ... 18.1 WAR in 1071 IP (.016 to .017) Steve Carlton ... 253 IP 3.6 WAR ... NEXT 1000 ... 23.3 WAR in 1202 IP (.014 to .019) Whitey Ford ... 225 IP 5.0 WAR ... NEXT 1000 ... 17.5 WAR in 1027 IP (.022 to .018) Obviously this is not exhaustive but on average you have .023 WAR/IP at the tipping point, .026 WAR/IP after, a 13% improvement. The basic idea that the first 1000 innings determines a fate which never improves over the next 4-5 seasons is very flawed. After all the 13% improvement assumes the performance stays flat the NEXT 1000 innings, which is of course false.

The history of young pitchers improving is relatively straightforward - setting aside the relatively arbitrary 4.00 ERA which would have been scandalously bad in 1971 and downright good in 2000. Plenty of guys like Tom Glavine, Kevin Brown, Randy Johnson, Doug Drabek (that took me less than 10 minutes to dig up) had significant mucking around periods before hitting their stride. It's more likely for 26 year olds to improve than not. Even somebody like Pedro, who was great from the second he took full time work ... had his first Cy Young in his age 26 season - and got better and better after that. Now the projection for Porcello was from #3 level starter to #2 level - which would have worked out well - was not franchise changing but totally reasonable. Happens all the time at his stage. Clearly it has not worked - and that has to be answered for (I have already suggested the field coaching to walk the plank).

Pretty much ... 200 innings of 2013-14 Porcello would make the deal a net win (albeit a smallish one). Ultimately he'll have to figure out where the groundballs went - the big source of his success.

Interesting guys. Orgs have goals the guys need to achieve to move up - some of it shows up in the box score, other stuff doesn't necessarily.

Here is the thing. When Lucchino clashed with some of the baseball ops, he was clashing with guys who he hired. And in Epstein's case, not just hire, but give his first job in baseball. He's had an eye for executive talent. And the baseball operations department has always been first rate. One hopes Kennedy has his eye on the ball and doesn't screw up the good stuff. His ultimate legacy in baseball is Camden Yards of course. I remember then too - the last 2 parks which had opened were SkyDome - which was out of a Jetson's episode, and US Cellular (then the New Comiskey Park). Camden Yards was such a striking difference - and it's still probably the best ballpark I have been to, in terms of emulating some of the distinctiveness of an old stadium without being cheesy.

They'll miss him - but not surprised.

You are probably right - although trading for fun is also stupid, so reserve the pathos for later. Also, Porcello has a lot of control left, so if a team sees an easy fix, he's not priced outrageously.

There won't be any substantial buys ... but sells are possible, especially with the bad contracts. I would not expect anything, but I would not be stunned either.

It is unfortunate. I've actually genuinely respected Larry. He has proven to be a good at running a baseball franchise - and that includes building a front office. Since a lot of "president" types come from the baseball operations side, it is easy to scapegoat a guy who does not - especially if he is a total loudmouth like Lucchino is. But from the time this ownership group took hold, he has hired exceptional baseball operations people. There was a power struggle - but you expect that, especially with a guy like Epstein who is too young to not have ambition for more. If he were in charge of the next GM hire, it would be a sound one (like a Jason McLeod perhaps).

Oh I'm not sure about that. Lucchino discovered Epstein, hired Kevin Towers (who was a good executive for a while), and kept the store open while Epstein was on sabbatical. The infrastructure organizationally is strong and there are enough "Sox guys" spread around that a replacement search could be done with a lot of qualified guys who they know already. Give a psuedo-promotion to Jed Hoyer, or an actual one to Jason McLeod. The caliber of guy has been less of an issue than how he fits into the org chart as a whole - that requires some more rethinking.

Farrell was the right man at the right time - but has not been good at advancing things. Cherington will not necessarily have autonomy in the managerial search. At the same time, there are plenty of solid candidates - and it could be as simple as Lovullo (though I doubt it).

Possibly that a little. But I think mostly they were seduced by his age (only top FA in the class under 30) and spray charts - which were tailor made for Fenway. He is a good athlete (which is why he has been able to be a decent 3B at his fitness level), so there was some upside if you wanted. There was definitely some "winning the press conference" though I tend not to blame Lucchino specifically. Lucchino after all is the one who has had the eye for executive talent. I don't think Lucchino is the leader in terms of looking at NESN ratings. But it is a reckoning the Sox could use. Kimmi is generally right - the team needs changes, but it's not actually that far away.

The deadline that matters is still a month away

He's 23. Posey is a better player - he is better than just about every catcher. And Swihart is not going to have as big a bat as elite corner infield prospects, wonderful. He was overpromoted, but the ceiling is obvious. Vasquez is going to play for a long time in the league - only question is whether he will be a good starter or an elite backup.

Plus that he should be good defensively too - an actual fast guy and whatnot. Rotating makes sense to get his bat in the lineup an extra 15-20 starts ... but he seems to be a legit C. Good problem to have for sure.

A deal like that could probably be done during the waiver period - so even if it could happen, there is no real reason for it to happen now.

I think fenway LF might confound metrics - Crawford is a good LF who was bad there. It is possible that being a good LF at Fenway requires specific things which says nothing about your ability to play LF in general. Rice for instance was for the most part not a good outfielder but handled the wall solidly.

Well, first both of them were replacing absolute zeroes in our lineup, 3B and LF. So just by having a breathing major leaguer there you hoped it would be a significant improvement. Also, Sandoval was an average 3B and Ramirez was moving from the hardest position on the field (where he was below average) to the easiest, so you'd like to think those were plusses. Throw in the fact that the Red Sox were 3rd in the AL defensively last season (h/t/ fangraphs) nd the ingredients were there for a positive defense. And what has happened is that by going from ++ to ok (Vasquez to the others) at catcher, and then Sandoval and Ramirez being well below any reasonable projection defensively, the team has fallen. (6th in the AL, but worse on an absolute basis than last year).

Additionally - and this was Cherington's big miscalculation - the Royals bullpen or starting have been ok (9th in AL fWAR), but the run prevention has been driven by brilliant defensive performance (1st by a mile). The premise that the Red Sox would be able to provide a positive defensive contribution, that was the misfire on the run prevention side. Remember entering the season, the question was really whether Bogaerts was any good. Sandoval was an average to above average defender at 3B and Ramirez was moving to the easiest position on the diamond (besides 1B, and that is debateable). Between the Vasquez injury, and the two FAs none of that came to pass, alas ... despite Bogaerts actually being perfectly good.

I don't think the Royals were specifically the blueprint. But the general idea of using strengths to mitigate weaknesses is pretty basic stuff throughout sports. If the supporting elements were better, the weak parts would have had more of a prayer to be successful. Great lineups and defense augmenting so-so pitching has won before, and will win again. Cherington's mistake (and you've deftly noted this before) was on the first two fronts more than the third.

You are moving the goalposts - who said run prevention was not important? I was just noting whether it had to come from some sort of mythic level of pitching you NEED. Royals didn't have it - the Giants largely didn't. 2006 Cardinals (genuine fluke since they were a mediocre team), 2002 Angels (good run prevention but Jarrod Washburn in a year he would not repeat). Also winning the Series is largely about matchups, health and luck - underdogs win it all the time, the best, most balanced team often does not win ... given how often a good team can lose 3 in a row over a 6 month season this is not any sort of surprise.